On 12 Nov 2012, at 13:29, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Leibniz thought that everything needs a sufficient reason to
exist as it does. Thus all of the parts of the universe have
a sufficient reason to be (as they are).  I don't know how to
explain that by anything other than the the "God" hypothesis.

It is always dangerous (for the mental sanity) to invoke "God" in an explanation. It is an easy evacuation of the problem.

But I can relate with this idea, though.

With comp, in fine, we need also a "God hypothesis", which seems to be innocent: as it is the "arithmetical truth hypothesis". It needs studies in logic to understand that such an hypothesis is quite strong, and share many religious principle with God, as we can only scratch a tiny part of arithmetical truth, and don't know really what it is. We can even not give it a name. Like "God", "arithmetical truth" is only a pointer to something which, assuming comp, intrinsically transcends us.

Note also that divine intellect (the complete quantified G*) is far more complex than Arithmetic Truth. Even with Arithmetical truth as oracle, the divine intellect (the arithmetical noùs) is undecidable. So the theology of the universal machine is even beyond "God". This is counter-intuitive and explains some difficulties and quasi divergence between Plato and Plotinus. Comp seems to side with Plotinus on this. God is simpler than its "creation/emanation", making it losing omnipotence and omniscience.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/12/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-10, 12:28:31
Subject: Re: Communicability


On 11/10/2012 6:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King

There's no mystery. That's presumably how a machine packed
them during manufacture.

Hi Roger,

    The order of the crackers has a cause, some physical process lead
to the order. When we are considering ontological models and theories
and using ideas that depend on epistemological knowledge, it is easy to fall into regress. I have found that regress can be controlled and there is even a nice mathematical theory that uses regressive sets - sets that have no least member and sets that have themselves as a member, but any time that we claim a 'cut off' there has to be sufficient reasons for it.


er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/10/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-09, 13:32:23
Subject: Re: Communicability


On 11/9/2012 11:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King

Get a box of crackers with the crackers all lined perfectly up inside.
No explanation at all is given as to how the cracker got to be
"perfectly lined up". ... Right.

That's Platonia.

Now invert the box and let the crackers fall, scattering on the
floor and some even breaking. That's our contingent world.

Nobody knows why, but that's the way time works.

--
Onward!

Stephen


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-- Onward!

Stephen


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