Hi Bruno Marchal My concept of the infinite regress problem is the one that pops up in materialistic theories of perception. Is there a homunculus in the brain to experience what the eye sees? And if so, does the homunculus have a homunculus inside him to interpret that etc. etc, etc.
Dennent wrote a whole book or a lot at least on that issue without coming up with a sensible solution other than to say that it just happens that there is no infinite regress because there cannot be one. It's similar to Aristotle's "First Cause" doctine. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/17/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-16, 11:27:09 Subject: Re: the "God" hypothesis On 15 Nov 2012, at 16:52, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist and Bruno, There is (infinite) regress in physical nature, but not in mind, because mind is non-existent (not created). There are a lot of infinite regress in arithmetic. I am not sure how you related this with created and uncreated. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/15/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-12, 11:46:34 Subject: Re: the "God" hypothesis On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 12 Nov 2012, at 15:55, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> Hi Roger Clough, >> >> Actually the action of mathematical physics gives "everything" the >> reason to live. >> As Hawking says, there is "no need for god if you got quantum gravity". >> >> I confess to giving cosmic consciousness a reason to live. >> http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf >> >> Hopefully, a benevolent, understanding, tolerant and forgiving >> consciousness, >> that somehow chooses the best universe from an infinitude of mental >> possibilities, >> according to Leibniz... >> >> But physical Nature can be stern and unforgiving. >> Life as we know it will eventually disappear from earth, >> for cosmic reasons later, if not human reasons sooner.. > > > Yes, life as we know it, but not necessarily life as we don't know it. Yes. My reasoning is incomplete as all reasonings should be. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Richard Ruquist >> >> >> >> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 7:29 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Stephen P. King >>> >>> Leibniz thought that everything needs a sufficient reason to >>> exist as it does. Thus all of the parts of the universe have >>> a sufficient reason to be (as they are). I don't know how to >>> explain that by anything other than the the "God" hypothesis. >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 11/12/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Stephen P. King >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-11-10, 12:28:31 >>> Subject: Re: Communicability >>> >>> >>> On 11/10/2012 6:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Stephen P. King >>>> >>>> There's no mystery. That's presumably how a machine packed >>>> them during manufacture. >>> >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> The order of the crackers has a cause, some physical process lead >>> to the order. When we are considering ontological models and theories >>> and using ideas that depend on epistemological knowledge, it is easy to >>> fall into regress. I have found that regress can be controlled and there >>> is even a nice mathematical theory that uses regressive sets - sets that >>> have no least member and sets that have themselves as a member, but any >>> time that we claim a 'cut off' there has to be sufficient reasons for it. >>> >>>> >>>> er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>>> 11/10/2012 >>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> From: Stephen P. King >>>> Receiver: everything-list >>>> Time: 2012-11-09, 13:32:23 >>>> Subject: Re: Communicability >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/9/2012 11:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Stephen P. King >>>>> >>>>> Get a box of crackers with the crackers all lined perfectly up inside. >>>> >>>> No explanation at all is given as to how the cracker got to be >>>> "perfectly lined up". ... Right. >>>> >>>>> That's Platonia. >>>>> >>>>> Now invert the box and let the crackers fall, scattering on the >>>>> floor and some even breaking. That's our contingent world. >>>>> >>>>> Nobody knows why, but that's the way time works. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Onward! >>>> >>>> Stephen >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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