it is perfectly possible to accept natural selection with all the implication in genetics without being a materialist.
The materialism is a superfluous ideological substrate. Sheldrake is right about this critic of materialism. I´m not materialist, and I accept Natural selection. Materialism is the logical consequence of the distrust of the human intellect that was Nominalism. This distrust condemned to in-existence any inner knowledge and reified only what produced effect that other can observe in the short term (complex and long term effects were disqualified because they where not so easily observable). So material is anything experimental, that is anything that is enough simple and enough immediate to be observable by many. This excludes long term, complex knowledge imprinted in the mind innately or culturally by natural or social selection. Then the common sense, the human aspirations, motivations and beliefs, are condemned to subjectivity, and rejected as object of study, only as matter of belief for the believers or a matter of engineering for the nonbelievers. I´m not being materialist besides I accept natural Selection. NS is not an agent of causation on the deep. neither matter is. Matter is a substrate. It is the sensible part that we perceive. this perception is composed by the mind, from the input of the anthropically selected mathematical reality. Natural selection only happens for beings living in time like us. From a timeless view, from above, the universe has spacetime locations where there is no dynamic of selection. There are only existence and inexistence. there are good spacetime trajectories that diverge and flourish and bad ones that are death paths. These paths have precise physiological and social laws in the same whay that they have phisical laws, that are derived from the mathematical structure of reality that indeed IMHO are a consequence of the antrophic principle of existence of the mind. It seems that the mind is computation, but the physical substrate, which is ultimately mathematical, only reflect this computation as well as the mind, but matter, being a product of the mind, can *not be *the causation of the mind. As a product of the mind, natter is a proxy for the study of the mind. trough natural selection.. Because NS is how we, as temporal beings perceive the very long term coherence between the mind and the anthropicallly selected mathematical reality 2013/1/6 Platonist Guitar Cowboy <multiplecit...@gmail.com> > > > On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy >> >> You've obviously never watched one of Sheldrake's >> lectures. >> > > Watched, listened, and even read some things a few years back. I sincerely > tried to open my mind, but when I realized I was forcing that, instead of > doing my homework, I dropped him. Doesn't mean he hasn't changed, but what > you posted sounds like the old song. Maybe my prejudice. > > >> All of his speculations are supported with >> empirical data. You'll find some of it on his website, >> others in his books and lectures. >> > > Aware of that. > > >> I watched the first hour of McKenna's lecture as given below, >> It was essentially a promo for taking drugs, and it showed no data, >> so finding him distasteful after watching for an hour, I gave up. >> >> > > May I ask what approximate criteria you associate with taste in this case? > > > >> So where's all of McKenna's data? >> > > He never pretended to have any. He's self-avowed fool: "the object of this > talk is that you never have to hear this sort of thing again in your life; > you can put that behind you" paraphrased from video. > > >> I think he died about a decade ago >> of some brain problem (could it have been from taking drugs?). >> > > Begging. > > >> His brother became a drug addict also, don't know what happened to him. >> >> > > Same again, which seems to indicate you don't really care. Otherwise one > google search and click would've wikied you this on a silver plate: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_McKenna > PGC > >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net <+rclo...@verizon.net>] >> 1/5/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-05, 07:15:28 >> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> Hi Everythingsters, >> >> When things get a little fringe, I want the best bang for my buck (time >> reading/listening in this case). Here Sheldrake only delivers when held in >> check by McKenna and Abraham, even if not stunning. >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> >> Terence McKenna, Rupert Sheldrake, Ralph Abraham - Metamorphosis >> by loadedshaman?1 year ago?15,768 views >> Terence McKenna, Rupert Sheldrake, Ralph Abraham - "Metamorphosis" (1995) >> 1:05:49 >> >> >> Otherwise, I find Sheldrake rather a sleeping pill. If we're gonna step >> into areas of wild speculation, then I want the writer/speaker to go as far >> as they can, instead of charting out curiosities as cracks in the sciences. >> >> Thus I simply prefer McKenna as wild speculator, as he at least leaves a >> trail for 1p to convince themselves of the trajectory of his speculation. >> So 1p can do some things to verify to a certain extent the wild >> propositions, and perhaps one day to lay things out more formally. >> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgQfC4WRg-g >> >> With Sheldrake, you're sort of just left with the speculation, and >> there's no harness whatsoever, which is why I fall asleep so quickly. >> PGC >> >> ? >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.com.<+everything-list@googlegroups.com.> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ >> unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. <+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.> >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.com.<+everything-list@googlegroups.com.> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ >> unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. <+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.> >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.com.<+everything-list@googlegroups.com.> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ >> unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. <+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.> >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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