On 1/16/2013 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 00:11, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/15/2013 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is
necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis
testable.
We have the logical entaiment:
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.
It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from
arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself
the result of a self-selection events (the global first person
indeterminacy).
This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.
But you stop one step too soon.
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness ->
arithmetic.
That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.
Brent
Hi,
I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that
there is something fundamental that has particular properties is
unscientific dogma'.
A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.
Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In
my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any
properties?
Dear Bruno,
I am amazed at your inability to understand this very simple idea.
It is just the generalization of what we see in the additive identity
in arithmetic, X - X = 0.
You need to assume properties to get X - X = 0. Or you need to assume
that X - X = 0, which will be an elementary property.
Dear Bruno,
Yes, at our level we must assume an a priori background of
differentiated property bundles (objects), this is just so that we can
communicate with each other.
Have you not understood the idea that Russell Standish discusses in
his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in his book is a great
example of the concept that I am using. When one imagines a substance
that has *all possible properties*, there would always be properties
within such that are equal and opposite to others such that they
cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition. This idea
also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the positive
numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero.
I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology,
but the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes
have anti-processes that would cancel them.
You have not been able to explain this, up to now.
I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
considered to have specific and definite properties if there does not
exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be coherent in
out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our primitives have
specific properties innately. All properties are the result of the
act of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily the most primitive.
That is solipsism.
Certainly! That is not a disqualification. Any entity that has no
ability to know anything other than itself, is by definition
solipsistic. The question that is relevant here is whether or not such
an entity can come to be able to bet that its existence is not alone. I
cannot know what it is like to be Bruno nor you can know what it is like
to be Stephen, but there is sufficient overlap between our "dreams" to
construct a measure of similarity and difference between us. This is a
local condition, not a global imposition.
This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the
result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness
and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.
I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming
elementary properties.
This is ontology, not symbolic logic. I am arguing in a different
category.
If you assume consciousness at the start (which might make sense in
some non-comp theory) you have to assume for consciousness that it has
the elementary property to make distinction (and this is already more
than arithmetic).
This is inconsistent in a ontological theory as I have pointed out
before.
One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of
well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and
others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well foundedness
- self-reference - and so the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an
intentional blindness.
Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the recursion
theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory, you are
definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed for comp,
and you are definitely assuming elementary properties contradicting
your claim.
Representationally, numbers do the job well, but I am trying to get
'under' the numbers. I see numbers as a derivative of actions, not as
ontological primitives, but they can be used, retroactively, to
represent knowledge and relations. This is simply because as
representations, numbers can represent themselves; unlike matter...
--
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
