On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:59:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Jan 2013, at 18:21, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 11:11:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 22 Jan 2013, at 23:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 4:20:58 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 3:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 3:49:09 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: >>> >> >>> >> On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >>> >> wrote: >>> >> > That doesn't have anything to do with your straw man of my >>> position. I >>> >> > have >>> >> > never once said that existence is contingent upon human >>> consciousness. I >>> >> > state again and again that it is experience itself - the capacity >>> for >>> >> > sensory-motor participation which is the progenitor of all possible >>> >> > forms of >>> >> > 'existence'. Something 'being' means that there is an experience, >>> >> > otherwise >>> >> > there is no possibility of anything ever coming into being. >>> >> >>> >> However, in a static Block MWI Universe there is no need for time or >>> >> consciousness or experience. >>> > >>> > >>> > Then in what sense does it 'exist'? >>> >>> It must be an illusion. Either that or MWI is an illusion. Doesn't >>> Bruno say that matter is a dream or illusion? Richard >>> >> >> I think MWI and block universe aren't even illusions, they are just ideas >> to defend mechanism against the fact that reality is only partially >> mechanistic. >> >> >> Once we assume mechanism, we can explain why reality needs to be only >> partially mechanistic. >> > > You get the same result by assuming that mechanism only needs to be a part > of reality. > > >> I think that you are confusing total computable with partial computable. >> The universality of the Turing machine makes her behavior not total >> computable. In fact it makes such machine much more a new unknown, that we >> can invite at the discussion table, than anything like an answer. >> > > The new unknown is worth exploring, for sure, but I'm only interested in > the integrating the realism of our direct experience with our indirect > scientific understanding. There may indeed be other Turning universes out > there, or in here, but I don't live in them yet, so I don't care. I would > care if I could, but my interest in science fiction has waned surprisingly > in the last 25 years. > > > > Mechanism is not a "part of something". It is a proposition about the > possibility of surviving with an artificial brain of some sort. >
Is there anything other than mechanism in the universe in your use of mechanism? > Then we get a quantitative explanation of how the laws of physics > "evolved"---logico-arithmetically, sufficiently precise to test the > hypothesis. Don't confuse science-fiction and theoretical reasoning. They > can overlap, but are different things. > They are different things, but sometimes we like to think that one is the other. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/cGG3Xaa9bWYJ. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Jd-t9onQ4nkJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
