On Friday, April 12, 2013 10:40:33 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Apr 2013, at 18:15, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:54:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 10 Apr 2013, at 22:55, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >> >> > On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following: >> > >> > ... >> > >> >> I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say that >> >> pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise the >> >> survivability of species in an environment that is largely also >> >> generated by evolution. It's a strange loop. >> >> >> > >> > What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your >> > sentence by god? >> >> >> The difference is that evolution assumes some mechanism. >> >> With comp you can define pain by the qualia associated to anything >> contradicting some universal goal. >> The most typical universal goal is "protect yourself". >> > > Why isn't the condition of "satisfying universal goal = false" sufficient? > > > In which logic? > It is the sufficient, but it must be written in the logic corresponding to > the relevant hypostasis (arithmetical point-of-view), and three of them > have qualia related to it. >
Why would a logic which relies on qualia be preferable to one which does not? > > > > > >> I imagine we send robots on a far planet where there are some acid >> rains which might demolish their circuits. We will provide mechanism >> so that when such rain occurs the robots find quickly some shelter. No >> need of pain at this stage, but if the machine is Löbian, she will be >> able to rationalize her behavior, so that when we ask her why she >> protect herself, she will will talk about her non communicable qualia >> she got when the rain is coming, and she might well call it pain. >> > > What does it mean to "talk about" that which is non-communicable? What she > calls it is irrelevant, but do her reports describe the qualia as "sharp" > or "dull"? Excruciating or irritating? Does it make her want to rip her > eyes out of her skull > > > It depends on the machine, the situation, the degree of the subgoal s > compared to the instinctive universal gial, etc. but roughloy speaking: > yes. That's the idea. > What is an example of the kind of output you are basing your interpretation on? > > > > or simply believe that it is time to escalate the priority of a search for > protection? Is there any indication at all that a Löbian machine > experiences any specific aesthetic qualities at all, or do you assume that > every time we ask a machine a question and it fails to communicate an > answer that it means that they must have a human-like conscious experience > which they cannot express? > > > Not all the time, nor with every machine. Only when it comes from the > relevant self-reference. > Why does that self-reference suggest an expectation of qualia? If I say "this sentence is self-referential" would it be more likely to be associated with qualia than another sentence? > > > > > > >> Such a theory predicted that if someone burn alive through suicide, >> that person would not necessarily feel pain. As sad as it is, this has >> been confirmed by some testimony of people doing just that. They >> describe being burn even as pleasurable, until they are brought to >> some hospital and then the pain becomes quite acute. (Hmm... I don't >> find the interview of women who burns themselves in Afghanistan when >> their husband cheat them, I will search when I have more times). >> This can also be related with some ZEN technic to diminish pain by >> "accepting it", and used in Japan to survive Chinese interrogations). >> > > Sure, pain is relative. > > > I am not sure about this. I'm afraid pain is absolute, like consciousness. > But pain can disappear when the soul disconnected from the universal goal, > or when the soul find a non terrestrial way to satisfy it, if that exist, > as it seems in the "theology of numbers". > Pain can disappear just from building up a tolerance to it. After repeated exposures, hot water no longer feels as hot. > > > > > Like all sense, it is defined by contrast, previous experience, and > expectation. > > > Some qualia related to pain might have some relative aspect, but I think > quite plausible that pain is absolute. > If you escape a pain, you just escape it, you don't look at it in a new > perspective, but you change altogether of the perspective. > I don't know it that's true. I think that people who are into masochistic stimulation feel pain, but they feel it as pleasurable also. I think that they do probably change progressively to look at it in a new perspective. With qualia you can argue either way. In one sense, pain is only that which is unambiguously painful. In another sense, pain can be ambiguous and context dependent. > > > > > > >> Pain can be the qualia brought by a frustration in a situation >> contradicting instinctive universal goals. >> The qualia itself can be explained by the combination self-reference + >> truth, that is the relatively correct self-reference, which lead the >> machine to acknowledge non justifiable truth. The negative aspect of >> the affect is brought by the contradiction with respect to universal >> goal, and is usually more intense when the goal is instinctive or >> hidden. >> >> Note that this needs a notion of truth, so the Platonist God is not >> far away, making your point, after all. >> > > Self-reference + truth is no substitute for aesthetic presence. > > > I would need some precise definition of aesthetic presence to be sure of > that. > Aesthetic presence cannot be defined, it can only be experienced directly. The reason for this is that all qualities of precision and definition are themselves nothing but aesthetic properties in the cognitive mode of appreciation. > > > > The notion of self-reference you are using is a superficial one rooted in > symbol manipulation rather than proprietary influence. > > > Number self-reference give 8 hypostases. Three of them are not related to > only symbol manipulation, but through the truth of some proposition > relating a possibility of 'proprietary influence". > A possibility is not the same thing as a positive indication. As long as there are other possibilities which fit more sensibly within arithmetic, I don't see any reason to hope that our experience can be found there. > > > > > Selfness defined this way is a silhouette with no content. > > > You say so, but don't give argument. > I don't understand what argument could be any more persuasive. A puppet can be made to act as if it were an autonomous person. I can video tape this puppet show and not the puppet can appear to be acting in a selfish way all by itself. Your argument seems to be that the only reason why this puppet is not literally a sentient being is just because the movie is not sophisticated enough, but if the movie were programmed to be able to play different loops in response to the relevant questions from the audience, then there would begin to emerge (from somewhere/nowhere) some authentic new person. I can see that this is obviously not the case and that this example, and the many others I have given, most convincingly perhaps with the logic automata example, that in fact self-referent mechanism is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain aesthetic participation. > > > In reality, authentic selfhood arises from aesthetic qualities > experienced, > > > I agree with this (being large in the interpretation of the vocabulary). > The machines agree too. I already told you this. > A machine will seem to agree to anything that it is programmed to agree to. You would have to give me specific examples if you want me to believe that any machine has ever described aesthetic experiences or personal preferences. > > > > not from logical conditions or non-communicable residues of arithmetic. > > > Why? (To make comp false as you wish, I think). > Because if logic and arithmetic could exist without aesthetic experiences and forms, then they would, and experience could not plausibly arise. It's not to make comp false, it's to show that if comp were true, then it would have no need of the universe we experience - no not only biological experiences, but even geometry. If comp didn't run on sense, then the universe which would exist could not contain any sense, as none would be required. Craig > Bruno > > > > > > > > Craig > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> > >> > Evgenii >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> > Visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> > . >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > >> > >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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