On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:
Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe
is immaterial. If the universe is infinitely large or
infinitely varied, we each reappear an infinite number of
times. There are a countably infinite number of programs, and
for any given level of complexity, there is a finite number of
possible programs shorter than some length. Any consciousness
we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large
universe, and if the universe is really this big, then someone
else far away could simulate you perfectly without having to
extract a record of you. Just running Bruno's UDA for a long
enough time "ressurects" everyone, we are all contained in that
short program.
To which, one is tempted to respond: So what? If there is all
this simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is
being done by being anything like us or that the worlds in which
the simulations take place (the "real" ones, if there are any)
are anything like this one.
Because the FPI makes "this one" a statistical sum on all
possible one.
What do you mean by "a statiscal sum"? FPI must still pick out
some kind of unity; not just an average.
Why? How so?
If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred to
one's experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that
experience. I experience being Brent Meeker. I don't experience
being Bruno Marchal.
FPI = First Person Indeterminacy.
When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your level of
substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the
infinitley many computations which go through your state. That's how
the FPI makes "this one" resulting from a statistical sum.
You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible
worlds, where "possible" can be anything from
"familiar enough I can understand it" to "nomologically
possible" to "not containing contradictions".
Possible means "livable from a first person point of view in such
a way that you would not see the difference above the
substitution level".
So all simulations must look just like this??
Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I
would say.
How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT
the case that everything happens here.
Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many
computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities.
Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on
eternal statistics on atemporal number relations.
"Everything physical happens" is really the "p -> BDp" explained by
the LUMs' theology, and it is more like "shit happens", to be short.
(I explain the math on the FOAR list if you are interested).
Bruno
Brent
Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien,
numbers ..) see the same average on all computations, which, due
to the constraints of self-reference and theoretical computer
science is a well structured, highly complex, mathematical object.
So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine
theology... and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism.
I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)
It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our
gulag, after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what
gives to religions (including materialist and atheist one) their
bad reputation. Read La Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.
Bruno
Brent
It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this
leads to a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on
"reality". It makes "Matter" into a failed hypothesis (Matter
=primitive matter).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6358 - Release Date:
05/25/13
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6360 - Release Date:
05/26/13
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
