On 28 May 2013, at 19:27, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
In my model which you have already said is not comp,
all the computational histories happen in a mindspace
and only one of them become physical.
Yes, that is what makes it into a non-comp theory, a bit like Bohm's
hidden variable theory.
In that case, the notion like particles, universes, in fact the whole
physical, seem to be build-in unexplainable.
Bruno
Richard
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 27 May 2013, at 20:44, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
With MWI are some universes less probable than others.
Only relatively to some state, some computational histories are less
probable. It is open if there is a more stringer notion of "probable
universe". Actually it is an open question is the notion of physical
multiverse make sense. There are only coherence conditions on
(sharable) dreams. Keep in mind that I am only translating a problem
in math. Then it is almost obvious it is more a platonist theology
than an Aristotelian theology. No one knows which one is correct.
I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical.
I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be.
I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make
sense either.
? Feel free to explain why. I think it is simpler to forget the
notion of physical universe, and to concentrate on the
"computational histories" as seen by a machine/number.
Obviously, "neoneo-platonism" is very young, and an infinity of
problems are awaiting us there.
Bruno
Richard
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:
Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe
is immaterial. If the universe
is infinitely
large or infinitely varied, we each reappear an infinite
number of times. There are a countably infinite number of
programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
finite number of possible programs shorter than some length.
Any consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of
something that exists somewhere else in the infinitely varied/
infinitely large universe, and if the universe is really this
big, then someone else far away could simulate you perfectly
without having to extract a record of you. Just running
Bruno's UDA for a long enough time "ressurects" everyone, we
are all contained in that short program.
To which, one is tempted to respond: So what? If there is all
this simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it
is being done by being anything like us or that the worlds in
which the simulations take place (the "real" ones, if there
are any) are anything like this one.
Because the FPI makes "this one" a statistical sum on all
possible one.
What do you mean by "a statiscal sum"? FPI must still pick out
some kind of unity; not just an average.
Why? How so?
If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred
to one's experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that
experience. I experience being Brent Meeker. I don't experience
being Bruno Marchal.
FPI = First Person Indeterminacy.
When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your level of
substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the
infinitley many computations which go through your state. That's
how the FPI makes "this one" resulting from a statistical sum.
You are simply led back to trying to discover what are
possible worlds, where "possible" can be anything from
"familiar enough I can understand it" to "nomologically
possible" to "not containing contradictions".
Possible means "livable from a first person point of view in
such a way that you would not see the difference above the
substitution level".
So all simulations must look just like this??
Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition,
I would say.
How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's
NOT the case that everything happens here.
Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many
computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative
probabilities.
Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely
on eternal statistics on atemporal number relations.
"Everything physical happens" is really the "p -> BDp" explained by
the LUMs' theology, and it is more like "shit happens", to be
short. (I explain the math on the FOAR list if you are interested).
Bruno
Brent
Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien,
numbers ..) see the same average on all computations, which,
due to the constraints of self-reference and theoretical
computer science is a well structured, highly complex,
mathematical object.
So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine
theology... and this in a way which saves humans from
reductionism.
I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)
It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our
gulag, after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what
gives to religions (including materialist and atheist one) their
bad reputation. Read La Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.
Bruno
Brent
It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this
leads to a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on
"reality". It makes "Matter" into a failed hypothesis (Matter
=primitive matter).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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