On 13 Jul 2013, at 01:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/12/2013 3:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Jul 2013, at 21:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/12/2013 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because if you agree with "I dunno which city I will see", by
deducing it through an explicit appeal to a level of mechanical
substitution, you see that the digital third person determinacy
is responsible for indeterminate, from the first person points of
view, experiences.
However this depends on there being no fact-of-the-matter as to
which man, Washington or Moscow, is "you". That either one is
"you" seems to depend on memories shared with you. Any other
interpretation would simply say you were annihilated and neither
man is you. This in turn depends on memories being classical
things - not subject to quantum interference phenomena
Comp is neutral on the quantum, at the start, then we have to
recover it or at least that is correct.
and not being reversible.
Irreversibility of first person experience can be recovered from
reversible computation.
That would be statistical irreversibility, i.e. reversal is
improbable but not impossible.
Why? Not necessarily. It can be 100% irreversible from the machine's
point of view.
Indeed some universal machine are reversible (billiard ball,
quantum computer, etc.).
But isn't there a distinction between reversible and irreversible
computations? Doesn't the UD do both of them?
Yes. The main difference is that irreversible computation needs
"energy" (can be virtual), and reversible does not. Erasing memory is
what cost energy in computation, but "erasing memory" can be simulated
by dissociation or discarding information. Quantum computations are
both Turing universal and reversible, like the SWE.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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