2013/8/22 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> > On 8/21/2013 11:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/8/22 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> > >> On 8/21/2013 2:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> Ok, and I'm fascinated by the question of why we haven't found viable >>> algorithms in that class yet -- although we know has a fact that it >>> must exist, because our brains contain it. >>> >> >> We haven't proved our brain is computational in nature, if we had, then >> we would had proven computationalism to be true... it's not the case. Maybe >> our brain has some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI >> is not possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that >> computations alone lack. I'm not saying AI is not possible, I'm just saying >> we haven't proved that "our brains contain it". >> >> >> There's another possibility: That our brains are computational in >> nature, but that they also depend on interactions with the environment (not >> necessarily quantum entanglement, but possibly). >> > > Then it's not computational *in nature* because it needs that little > ingredient, that's what I'm talking about when saying "Maybe our brain has > some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is not > possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that computations > alone lack." > > > It's not non-computational if the external influence is also > computational. >
If it is, you've not chosen the right level... the whole event + brain is computational and you're back at the start. > But the reaction of a silicon neuron to a beta particle may be quite > different from the reaction of a biological neuron. So AI is still > possible, but it may confound questions like,"Is the artificial > consciousness the same as the biological." > If it's computational, it is computational and AI at the right level would be the same as ours. > > > > >> When Bruno has proposed replacing neurons with equivalent input-output >> circuits I have objected that while it might still in most cases compute >> the same function there are likely to be exceptional cases involving >> external (to the brain) events that would cause it to be different. This >> wouldn't prevent AI, >> > > It would prevent it *if* we cannot attach that external event to the > computation... > > > No, it doesn't prevent intelligence, but it may make it different. > It does (for digital AI) if the ingredient is non-computational and that there is no way to attach it to the digital part without (for example) a biological brain. > > if that external event was finitely describable, then it means you > have not chosen the correct substitution level and computationalism alone > holds. > > > Yes, that's Bruno's answer, just regard the external world as part of the > computation too, simulate the whole thing. > Well if your ingredient, is the whole of physics, then it's self defeating, and computationalism is false... if it's some part of it, then at that level the "realness" of our consciousness is digital and computationalism holds. Quentin > But I think that undermined his idea that computation replaces physics. > Physics isn't really replaced if it has to all be simulated. > > Brent > > > .. the only way to go out of that if for that event to be > non-computational in nature. > > Regards, > Quentin > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
