On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 7:44 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 8/21/2013 11:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/8/22 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >> >> On 8/21/2013 2:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> Ok, and I'm fascinated by the question of why we haven't found viable >>> algorithms in that class yet -- although we know has a fact that it >>> must exist, because our brains contain it. >> >> >> We haven't proved our brain is computational in nature, if we had, then we >> would had proven computationalism to be true... it's not the case. Maybe our >> brain has some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is >> not possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that >> computations alone lack. I'm not saying AI is not possible, I'm just saying >> we haven't proved that "our brains contain it". >> >> >> There's another possibility: That our brains are computational in nature, >> but that they also depend on interactions with the environment (not >> necessarily quantum entanglement, but possibly). > > > Then it's not computational *in nature* because it needs that little > ingredient, that's what I'm talking about when saying "Maybe our brain has > some non computational shortcut for that, maybe that's why AI is not > possible, maybe our brain has this "realness" ingredient that computations > alone lack." > > > It's not non-computational if the external influence is also computational. > But the reaction of a silicon neuron to a beta particle may be quite > different from the reaction of a biological neuron. So AI is still > possible, but it may confound questions like,"Is the artificial > consciousness the same as the biological." > > > >> >> When Bruno has proposed replacing neurons with equivalent input-output >> circuits I have objected that while it might still in most cases compute the >> same function there are likely to be exceptional cases involving external >> (to the brain) events that would cause it to be different. This wouldn't >> prevent AI, > > > It would prevent it *if* we cannot attach that external event to the > computation... > > > No, it doesn't prevent intelligence, but it may make it different. > > if that external event was finitely describable, then it means you have not > chosen the correct substitution level and computationalism alone holds. > > > Yes, that's Bruno's answer, just regard the external world as part of the > computation too, simulate the whole thing. But I think that undermined his > idea that computation replaces physics. Physics isn't really replaced if it > has to all be simulated.
But it might be relegated to the same status as social sciences, where it provides workable approximations but has no hope of achieving a TOE. Telmo. > Brent > > > .. the only way to go out of that if for that event to be non-computational > in nature. > > Regards, > Quentin > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
