On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 4:54:20 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> >but what policies can produce an effect ab initio?
>
> then is there anything wrong with saying the *implementation* of the rules 
> of GOL produce the behavior of the game?
>

Nothing wrong with that, no, just like there's nothing wrong with saying 
that the implementation of a cookie cutter produces the shape of the 
cookie. I'm pointing out that it's still the metal and the cookie dough, 
and the intent of the baker that are doing the heavy lifting.
 

>
>
>
> i think you missed the nuance of what i was asking. (i was trying 
> fecklessly to make it clear with few words) i dont want moral implications, 
> but empirical ones. I might observe identical outputs from an AI that 
> "doesn't really feel" and a human or something else that uncontroversially 
> "does feel." I might observe the exact same thing whether or not the ai has 
> a true inner life. what can i predict i might see or hear that is a 
> consequence of your position bring true that isnt merely a consequence of 
> your position being believed to be true? (obstensibly, we wouldnt worry 
> about building ai's that can feel if we believed your position, even if it 
> was false)
>

My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of the 
test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell the 
difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, get a 
small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show them 
short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context. If you want to 
really bring out the differences between the two, use a diverse audience 
and have them interact freely for a long time in many different contexts, 
often without oversight. What you are looking for is aesthetic cues that 
may not even be able to be named - intuitions of something about the AI 
being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps, non-fluidity, etc. It's sort 
of like taking a video screen out into the sunlight. You get a better view 
of what it isn't when you can see more of what it is.



> On Wednesday, September 4, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 2:45:30 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>>
>>> Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
>>>> anything
>>>
>>>
>>> What about something like Conway's Game of Life? Why is it wrong to see 
>>> the behavior of the game as produced by the rules of the game and initial 
>>> conditions?
>>>
>>
>> Because something has to be able to 
>> 1) privately sense the conditions which are being 'ruled', 
>> 2) respond to those conditions with a public facing motive-strategy, and 
>> 3) have the power to cause a public effect using 2 (i.e. the power to 
>> influence distant 1 experiences). 
>> Otherwise it's rules, schmules. What cares about the rules, and how is 
>> the more fundamental issue. Once we have the factory, the workers, the raw 
>> materials, then sure, policies and procedures can be said to 'produce' a 
>> product, but what policies can produce an effect ab initio?
>>
>>
>>>  To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
>>>> that this emoticon...
>>>
>>>
>>> So are you or are you not making a predictive statement about what can 
>>> be done using a system of rules? What exactly is it you are saying cannot 
>>> be done? (Not what cannot be *explained*, but what cannot be done). 
>>> What are the practical implications?
>>>
>>
>> One practical implication is that we don't have to worry about 
>> accidentally creating AI which can feel or suffer. Otherwise I suppose the 
>> practical consequences are to do with how we live individually and socially 
>> - to see clearly where private and public approaches are appropriate and 
>> avoid the pathological extremes. I mean the implications are huge, 
>> ultimately...the reconciliation of religion, philosophy, and science, the 
>> dawn of a new era of understanding, blah blah blah, but that's anybody's 
>> guess.
>>
>> Systems of rules are great, and they can only be better if we understand 
>> more about what it is that we are ruling. Or if/when they aren't great, we 
>> can understand that there is a whole other half of the universe we can look 
>> to for ways to escape them. The effects of over-signifying the quantitative 
>> are so pervasive and invasive that its going to take a miracle for people 
>> to adjust to a different view. It's like a hardcore meth addict considering 
>> for the first time that maybe there is a down-side to the drug.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
>> meaningless...
>>
>>
>>  Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a 
>> technical fashion.
>>
>>  Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire
>>
>>
>> mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical 
>> statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if 
>> a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although 
>> apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped 
>> the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there 
>> sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as 
>> exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, "No matter what 
>> behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it 
>> cannot be desire"? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is 
>> wrong?
>>
>>
>> Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
>> anything. They are abstractions we use to analyze experiences after the 
>> fact. To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
>> that this emoticon ;) is not actually happy. The evidence is in our shared 
>> understanding (as is all evidence). What would convince you that your 
>> thesis is wrong?
>>  
>>
>>
>> Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a 
>> good Straw Man. 
>>
>>  
>> me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something 
>> that has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't 
>> claim that that you thought there were no rules period.
>>
>>
>> Sorry, I see what you mean. It was more of the same claim twice. Since I 
>> don't believe X can exist, I also don't believe that X can exist (at all). 
>> My view is that since I understand why X doesn't yield Y, I'm not swayed by 
>> the counter argument 'maybe you don't understand X as much as you 
>> think'...which leads us back to 'maybe you don't understand my 
>> understanding as much as you want me to think'...
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified 
>> principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that 
>> govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as justified,
>>
>>
>> Determinism is a lo
>>
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