On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> >> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: >> >> >> > >> >> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I >> am >> >> >> > not >> >> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised >> >> >> > about. >> >> >> > By >> >> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include >> >> >> > being >> >> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft >> >> >> > contingencies >> >> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no >> >> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been >> sure >> >> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the >> door >> >> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe >> the >> >> >> paradox still holds. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If >> I >> >> > say >> >> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise >> when', >> >> > that >> >> > is already a contradiction. >> >> >> >> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. >> >> The judge lied. You convinced me! :) >> > >> > >> > Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect >> some >> > lost mathematical-logical ability. >> > >> >> >> >> (with due credit to Alberto and >> >> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be >> >> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise >> >> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if >> >> you do". >> >> >> >> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 >> >> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns >> >> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to >> >> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the >> >> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker >> >> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that >> >> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) >> >> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there >> >> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple >> >> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the >> >> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will >> >> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one >> >> can do. >> >> >> >> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. >> > >> > >> > Nice. >> > >> >> >> >> I >> >> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily >> >> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are >> >> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as >> >> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? >> > >> > >> > Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since >> > falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on >> the >> > same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public >> > physics. >> >> Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of >> phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think >> this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of >> accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what >> characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality >> irrelevant or even reject its existence. >> >> > Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, > we can only take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit > or deny that we are taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we > would want to minimize the significance of that. > > >> >> >> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're >> >> proposing? >> > >> > >> > There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of >> understanding by >> > correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more >> at the >> > hypothesis stage than the testing stage. >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. >> >> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the >> >> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming >> >> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural >> >> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural >> >> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the >> >> symbols. Why not? >> > >> > >> > Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns have a >> > smell? >> >> I don't know! But I think the mystery is not so much how symbols >> appear or why they appear. Computers can do that. > > > Computers don't use symbols. > > > ? > > > They use physics, > > > ??? > > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. >
If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What symbols does it use? > > > > > and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic universality > which can be exploited. Computers don't care about symbols though, or > output formats. > > > > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but brain > and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory aesthetics? > > > > >> The big mystery is >> how they become qualia. > > > That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer. In my > understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling or 'accounting' > of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished feelings. > > > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That becomes > circular, it seems to me. > Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute. > > > > >> Which leads me to a point where I can >> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private >> experiences have at least the same reality status as public >> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw >> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water. >> > > I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not private. > There are experiences, and there are private experiences in which other > private experiences are re-presented as public form-functions. > > > OK, > Cool Craig PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense to you...there's a new one: http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/ http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
