On Saturday, September 21, 2013 1:02:40 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 20 Sep 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>
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>> On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
>>> > wrote:
>>> >
>>> >>
>>> >> Computers don't use symbols.
>>> >
>>> > ?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> They use physics,
>>> >
>>> > ???
>>> >
>>> > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
>>> >
>>> > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What
>>> > symbols does it use?
>>>
>>> it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,
>>> for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.
>>>
>>
>> The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
>>
>>
>> Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program use
>> only the gears, like a mechanical clock.
>>
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> That's my point :) Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for human
> debuggers.
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> yes, but only jokingly so.
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How do you mean?
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>> But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person sensors,
>> which are just some measuring apparatus.
>>
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> Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and made
> the janitor king of the universe.
>
>
> ?
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> I didn't refer to God.
>
I know, it's just that in my view, the entire cosmos is a sensor. I was
anticipating that you would reject mentions of 'cosmos' or 'universe', but
sometimes you use God or theology.
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> Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to run in
> a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers, who might want
> to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement with *our* human
> aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about sense, because it's
> unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic.
>
>
> What you say is correct, but only in a relative sense. We have discussed
> this already (with the simulation of the typhoon capable of making a
> virtual person feeling wet).
>
I don't think the simulated typhoon would make the virtual person feel wet
any more than it would make them smell seaweed. Why would it?
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> Let us try not being in a loop ourselves!
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>> Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if there
>> is one) enacted by that program.
>>
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> That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally enacted
> person. If a program can function without such a person, or proto person,
> then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing the enacting of a
> person if not a digital person?
>
>
> The first person, which is not something entirely digital, as it is
> infinitely many computations, selected through consciousness.
>
If you have consciousness, I think that you don't need infinitely many
computations, you only need the history of experience. Computations are
only required if you want to make precise measurements from one level of
experience and import-export them to-from another.
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>
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>>>
>>>
>> I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental
>> experience, computer = derived non-experience.
>>
>>
>> Indeed.
>>
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> So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than computation,
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> I meant 'more fundamental than the physical computer'.
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> Then our personhood is more fundamental but only from our first person
> point of view, which arise from the (immaterial) computations, which arise
> from + and *.
>
If computations can be immaterial, why do we only see them associated with
material? To say that anything arises from + and * is speculation. If not
for our own subjectivity, there would be nothing to give us any idea that
such a thing could be associated with computation (or physics). Only when
we start with sense can we find a coherent explanation for the other two.
>
>
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> yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a contradiction,
> right?
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> False, see just above.
>
As far as I can tell, comp is just demanding that we poke out one of our
eyes in order to see that depth perception is an illusion.
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>> I'm open to it being the reverse,
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>> I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is
>> true).
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> No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that nobody can
> disagree with me.
>
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> So there is hope.
>
Sure. I don't have to be right, but I'm certainly not wrong because of any
of the reasons that have been mentioned here.
>
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>>>
>> Why would non-human people be different?
>>
>>
>> OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the physics is
>> the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps contradicting me on
>> this issue and I don't know what to think about that!).
>>
>
> Heheh. I liked Nitrous Oxide, myself. Never tried saliva. It looks kind of
> sloppy from the videos.
>
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> Salvia can provide a curious hallucination, which, even as an
> hallucination, seems to be an impossible thing to experience or remember.
> It is close to a total mystery for me.
>
> It is interesting to realize how much altered a consciousness state can be.
>
> But unlike most drugs, it is not euphoric. It is classified as dysphoric,
> and most people are very uneasy with that experience.
>
Shouldn't they be?
>
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>>>
>>> As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness
>>> appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very
>>> interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
>>> Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.
>>>
>>
>> Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers to is
>> intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real substance of what
>> I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where all x is not only simply
>> x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x by its negative universality.
>>
>>
>> You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old.
>>
>
> Ok, let's say that the universe is only the visible spectrum. If we wanted
> a really Absolutely complete definition of one color in the spectrum -
> let's say blue, then we would want to reflect the fact that blueness
> includes all of its potential relations with all of the colors that are not
> blue. Blue and red have a certain relation. Blue plays a certain role in
> blue, red, and green, etc.
>
> That set of {all color relations between blue and any non-blue color} we
> could call the artistic or poetic blue. It is super-personal and allows all
> blue associations to freely commute.
>
> That goes at the top of the integral. It's the maximum number of blue
> associations. The bottom of the integral is the opposite sense of blue,
> which is how blue stands on its own in the most literal terms - like how an
> average person sees electromagnetic wavelength of 500nm.
>
> That integral itself, and here's the tricky part, is nested as well. So
> it's:
>
> unambiguous blue {scientific
> blue}---------------{artistic blue}
>
> | |
> |_______________________________________|
> |
> |
> blue
>
> Think of it as a monadology extension. For every blue, there is an
> implication of all that blue can be and cannot be, and there is an
> implication of only one thing that blue can be. In between the two is the
> continuum of each and every instance of what blue actually has been.
>
> In my analysis, comp can only hit the ends of the continuum. It can
> compute a function that is used as blue would be, and it can contact the
> arithmetic truth of all the possible relations between that function and
> all other functions, but it cannot get inside the continuum. It has the
> alphabet, and it has the entire contents of the internet, but it doesn't
> have any reason to write about anything. It has no events to tie together
> the elemental and the universal, or rather, it has no entropy to separate
> them.
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>
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> To string negative assertion in a too fuzzy theoretical context. I can't
> really follow you.
>
Interesting. I thought you might have a feel for the programmatic flavor of
it.
Craig
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> Bruno
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>>
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>> Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other
>> identity (not x) and what they cause x to become in their local frame of
>> reference.
>>
>> I was trying to explain 'artistic blue' here - the sum total of all
>> poetic combination potentials between blue and not blue.
>>
>
> Craig
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>
>
>> ?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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