On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal > > wrote: > > > >> > >> Computers don't use symbols. > > > > ? > > > > > >> They use physics, > > > > ??? > > > > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. > > > > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What > > symbols does it use? > > it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols, > for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage. >
The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic > >> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about > >> symbols though, or output formats. > > > > > > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but > > brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. > > > > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and > > focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory > > aesthetics? > > Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp > theory. > > I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental experience, computer = derived non-experience. I'm open to it being the reverse, but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is because we want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense theory :) ) then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason. > > > > > > > > > >> > >> The big mystery is > >> how they become qualia. > >> > >> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer. > >> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling > >> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished > >> feelings. > > > > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That > > becomes circular, it seems to me. > > > > Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all > > experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute. > > OK. (for the human people). > Why would non-human people be different? > > > > > > > > > > > >> > >> Which leads me to a point where I can > >> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private > >> experiences have at least the same reality status as public > >> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw > >> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water. > >> > >> I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not > >> private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences > >> in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form- > >> functions. > > > > OK, > > > > Cool > > > > Craig > > > > PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense > > to you...there's a new one: > > > > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/ > > > > > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ > > > As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness > appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very > interesting, but it does not need to be postulated. > Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry. > Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers to is intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real substance of what I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where all x is not only simply x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x by its negative universality. Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other identity (not x) and what they cause x to become in their local frame of reference. Craig > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
