On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:39:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Sep 2013, at 18:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:55:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> > >> > >> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:26:35 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal >> > wrote: >> > >> > <snip> >> > >> > Beyond the ambiguities, comp put the physical universe in the gap, >> > when the gap is modeled by the logic "*" minus the logic not-"*". >> > >> > Why just the physical universe though? Don't you think comp needs to >> > put itself in the gap too? >> >> Here I model the gap by the difference between true and provable, >> versus true and not provable. >> > > That's not the gap I'm talking about though (I didn't know that was even a > gab that was being discussed anywhere, tbh.). The Explanatory Gap, > > > Yes, thats the one. > > > philosophically, > > > That means nothing for me. >
I'm referring to the particular use of the term "Explanatory Gap" in philosophy of mind literature. > > > > is about what is experienced directly and what is experienced as present > independently of our direct experience. > > > You mean memories? > No, memories I consider direct experiences, since they require only that we are conscious. Indirect experiences would be experiences which we can only detect using our body's sense organs. Indirect experiences are 3p, thus they are bodies in space, direct experiences are 1p, so they can contain any combination of imagined forms, thoughts, feelings, etc. > > > > Direct experiences include those which seem true, experiences which seem > provable, and experiences which seem unrelated to either proof or truth but > are merely aesthetic, euphoric, qualitative, phenomena as sources of > appreciation. Where does fiction fit into your gap? > > > In human imagination or delire, I guess. Not sure seeing any problem here. > But what makes imagination fictional in comp? > > > > > >> It amazes me at first that physics seems to appear only in the gap, >> but then it is coherent with the idea that is is a first person plural >> emergence, and that is confirmed by Everett QM. If we look at the same >> particles we do get entangled and share the foregoing history. That's >> why Everett saves computationalism from solipsism. >> >> > I don't know that we are looking at the right thing in QM. Instead of > particles, or waves which physically exist, we should focus on what gives > physics the ability to cohere as 'particles' or 'waves' in the first place > - what would make laws of nature manifest as 'forms', when they don't seem > to do that in a pure computation (i.e. The Mandelbrot Set requires a > graphic plot to visualize, it doesn't create graphics out of its arithmetic > relation). > > > Yes it does. Graphic plots just make it easy, and pleasing, for humans to > relate with them. The geometry is in the arithmetical relations. > Ah, see that's the problem. Why would humans be pleased by something different than what would please arithmetical relations? Why should any computation have a smell? > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > I mean G* minus G, etc. In fact physics (should) appear in Z* minus >> > Z, X* minus X. >> > >> > G* and G don't show up in a Google search. I've never really >> > understood what you mean by that, but you're welcome to explain if >> > you have time. >> >> I have done this many times on this list, > > > I know, sorry about that. It hasn't sunk in yet for me. > > > OK. There are good books referred in the bibio of the book and papers, in > my URL. > ok > > > > > but I will explain it again >> on FOAR soon, or later. But I can say to words. G is the modal logic >> of Gödel's beweisbar (provability by PM, or PA, I mean Principia >> Mathematica, pr Peano Arithmetic, or any Löbian machine). >> In fact G correspond to the provability proposition that the machine >> can prove about herself, and G* corresponds to the true, but not >> provable by the machine, propositions. >> > > Ohh, ok. This is the two poles of your version of the Gap (which is not > explanatory at all, but merely provable). > > > ? > Nothing in the gap is provable. true yes (trivially given that I limit > myself on correct machines), but never provable by such machine. G* minus G > = what is true but non provable. > Right, but truth, proof, and everything in between are not explanations, they are only an accounting of logical convictions. It is true that I ate pizza, but I can't prove it. That gap is not the same gap as the one which explains why chewing up a collection of organic molecules is associated with a particular phenomenon which we call 'tasting the flavor (of pizza)'. A machine can know everything about those molecules, far more than I can, but why would there be a "flavor" if, as you say, the geometry (of the molecules) is in the arithmetic relations? Why would arithmetic relations even use geometry to represent themselves to themselves? > > > > > G for a human might be, that they are in a hotel, but G* might be that > they cannot prove which hotel they are in from inside of the room, but they > know that the hotel is in Geneva. Or something like that. > > > The machine can still prove that if she is really in the hostel, then she > cannot prove it. > Can she prove that her proof can be proven? (Still, this has nothing to do with the Explanatory Gap.) > > > > > We're not really talking about the same things then. To me modal logic is > only relevant to something which relates to logic, and that rules out the > entire universe of aesthetically experienced physics. > > > On the contrary, modal logic is for application of logic to modal aspect > of the human reality. > Are aesthetic experiences modal aspects of human reality? Is the flavor of pizza modal? Not the judgements about the flavor of pizza, but the appreciation of the actual flavor. If we were talking about a piece of music, the gap would be not between the notes on the page and the understanding of how to play the piece, but between the mechanics of the music theory plus acoustic physics and the non-mechanical aesthetics of giving and receiving the performance. The actual event, rather than the idea of an event-like data set. > > > > > In my view modal logic has no way to access any kind of experience, > > > Modal logic is *about* that. It is not simply that. > Simply what? > > Treatises on planes cannot fly either. > Right but they cannot build planes either, unless someone who can read them has the materials and skill. > > > > > it assumes it from the start. It assumes a condition of 'provable' or > 'true' as independent of experience rather than qualities which are > abstracted from aesthetic comparisons. > > > > But that exists, once you agree that 17 is prime, or not, independently of > me and you. > Independently of me and you, sure, but not necessarily independent of sense-making itself. You are putting 'me and you' in between the machine and arithmetic truth, but I'm saying that arithmetic truth is between matter and sense-making in general, which is more primitive than matter or numbers. > > > > If I count five fingers, each one becomes an identical digit. If I count > five leaves, it is the same digit of five. If I have just a digit of five > however, it does not lead to an imagination of leaves or fingers unless I > have experienced those prior to counting. > > > Yes, of course. But monkey's fetus seems able to dream of trees before > seeing them, and with comp this is rather normal, as seeing is supported by > brain activity. Likewise, arithmetic contains all such dreams. > Why would arithmetic have dreams, other than as formless arithmetic relations? Where is it getting the aesthetic sensations from, and why? If we flip it the other way it works much better. Aesthetic sensations are the Absolute. From sense is derived a discernment between Absolute and subordinate, and that is the birth of quantitative sense. Arithmetic sense is the skeleton that sense uses to grow on, but it is not a presence or an awareness. The ubiquity of its truth comes from its timelessness and generality, not from authenticity. In practice of course, as human beings, some of us are better suited to enjoy a life from the opposite perspective. Because of the symmetric nature of sense, it works with the tail end first as well for almost everything. Everything,. except consciousness. Consciousness cannot exist tail first. It cannot be conjured by figures, it can only be passed on directly through appreciation of sensation directly, without any computation. Beyond that, it's more practical and more intelligent approach to use comp. Since we find ourselves operating within this narrow theater of spacetime, it's indeed imperative that we master the quantitative to the extent that we can in order to be able to control our circumstances locally. For those conditions that go beyond intelligence however, and into wisdom, it would be very dangerous to leave our worldview upside down. We'll end up being digital steaks and your 'sun in law's' restaurant. > > > > > > > For example, take the (self) consistency proposition ~B f (I don't >> prove the false). This is a typically true proposition (trivially for >> the correct machines) but not provable by the machine. So you have G* >> proves ~B f, but G does not prove it. >> > > Does ~B f need to be proved, or is it just a given that something is > conditionally 'truish', where truish = ~B f, true in the sense of it hasn't > been disproved? It's not clear to me why ~B f needs G* to prove it. > > > It does need G*. G* came after, summarizing infinite conversation that we > can have with Peano Arithmetic (say) about Peano Arithmetic. It is just a > handy tool for us, notablmy to derive physics from number self-references. > Is the physics that is derived the physics of our universe, or more a general impression of physical pantomime? Do only our astrophysical constants drop out? > > > > > On the contrary, the sentence ~Bf -> ~B(~B f), which is the modal >> translation of the second incompleteness theorem, (which says if I am >> consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent) *is* a theorem of >> G, meaning that Löbian machine can prove their own incompleteness. >> > > But can it prove that the proof of incompleteness isn't part of its > completeness on another level? > > > ? > Can its proof of its unprovable true hunch itself be a mistaken proof...one which is seems provable, but is not true. That's basically what I think comp is - the inverted image of superstition. Where superstition might be overstating the significance of the unprovable beyond truth, then the overconfidence in comp leads to 'hypostition' or maybe 'empiritis': overstatement of the significance of the provable until *the truth is forced to lie*. This is what quantum mechanics and astrophysics has led us into - a state of hyperextended reliance on measurement that conjures its own self-referential mirage. Because both math and physics are not 100% authentic (they are both derived as second order senses), they have limits, beyond which they degenerate into confirmation bias. They are reduced to consistency for the sake of consistency; orderly voids. > > > > How does it know if it can prove anything? Why do we attribute an > expectation of proof? > > > The same question arise in between humans. Why segregate the machine a > priori. Kepe in mind that I *assume* computationalism. > But why do you assume computationalism? > > > > > >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > Like I said, beyond ambiguities, what you say fits very often comp, >> > except when you argue *from* what you say, that comp has to be >> > false, of course. >> > >> > Hehe, I can do what comp can't :) >> >> Comp is not a person, and not-comp makes the life of my sun-in-law >> miserable ... ;) >> > > His life can't be miserable, because we can just peg some register in him > to be happy no matter what. > > > Oh! You want my sun in law to forget his misery with artificial paradise? > Again, humans do that too. > Sure, but humans place a lower value on artificial paradise than aesthetic experience. It is frowned upon to live in a garbage dumpster and smoke crack, but it is not at all clear that would be the case with your sun in law. You only slip out of it by saying that you assume he must be like us because you assume comp - but comp is wrong. I don't just assume that it is, I understand exactly why it is. I understand why it is almost right as well, but ultimately, what arithmetic is based on is the imposter rather than the genuine, the representation rather than the presentation. My wife was telling me a story of one of her flutists - an engineering grad student, who is Japanese and was expressing how tired he was from a particular class, which involved a lot of English conversation. She was asking about how hard it must be to have to translate the English into Japanese into Music and back into English. He said yes, and also that he had to keep the numbers straight too. “Numbers?” She asked… “Yes, while I’m playing I have to keep counting the numbers of the beat.” My wife shocked him by responding that no, there are no numbers. There should be no language, because the music is already the language. You feel the beat, like this (taps his shoulder in 4/4 time). It was a revelation for him. She gave him homework to purge his mind of all language while practicing the flute over the weekend, and I got another interesting example of how feeling is more direct than counting. If you stop to think about it, if the brain were only a computer, why would we have to learn to count? It takes years to learn simple arithmetic but we come out of the womb with odd capabilities already online…we have a baby sense of humor, a baby sense of tragedy, etc. Why not 1+1=2, or binary code, eh? - See more at: http://s33light.org/post/61762401896#sthash.fOBaAJda.dpuf > > > > He doesn't need a steak, because he's got steak equivalent data tables to > eat. > > > We don't need steak either, we need only the sensation, and they are > indeed provided by some relative arithmetical relations. > Why would they be? Why not just have the arithmetical relations without any sensation at all? I can count the notes in a song on an abacus without the abacus turning into the sensation of music. It's a huge leap across the Explanatory Gap that you're taking and you aren't even noticing a crack in the sidewalk. Again, why would an arithmetic relation have anything associated with it at all? Just use variables. If you beg for one miracle, I'll give you physics, but physics is only durable positions and locations. Why would there be a smell? How could there be? > Brain enacted them, in the relevant situation, but some dreams and drugs > can provides them to. > Of course, but you're talking about the real non-comp world, and exporting our expectations from here back into the never never land of comp. There is no reason to expect that giving an arithmetic relation a drug will make it see or hear. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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