On 26 Sep 2013, at 07:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/25/2013 8:37 PM, LizR wrote:
Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought
experiment should logically have the same problem with the MWI. If
for the sake of argument I use a quantum event to decide whether to
get on a plane to Moscow or Washington, then my diary will contain
one or the other destination - in two universes - and the concept
of "I" has to take into account that this is the case.
Unless you take Scott Aaronson's view that teleportation requires
transmitting the quantum state to Moscow, in which case the no-
cloning theorem implies that the original in Helsinki is destroyed.
I think that the relevant structure of the brain is quasi-classical
and so a classical copying will produce a working copy with a gap in
memory, just like anesthesia. But that also implies that the two
copies will immediately be distinct. They don't have to wait to
look outside.
OK.
And note that if someone believe in comp, but believes also that the
substitution level is below the Heisenberg uncertainty limit, which
would be the case if the brain is a quantum machine, then, although
the first six steps of UDA do no more work as such, the seven step
still work. Indeed the Universal Dovetailer will emulate all quantum
state too (Quantum computation does not violate Church's thesis). The
conclusion will still followed, but the first person indeterminacy is
harder to define and manage in that case.
Like you I doubt that this is the case, despite plants seems to have
evolved some quantum optimization of photon path. This is possible
with photon, and I don't see the brain doing this. the micro-tubular
structure (Hamerov) is too hot (Tegmark is rather convincing on this).
Now we can't be sure, but as I said, this would not make the reasoning
invalid, as the main reversal point is made at step 7, and steps 1-6
are just pedagogical tools to explain the 1p indterminacy and its main
invariance properties.
Bruno
Brent
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