On 27 Sep 2013, at 03:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2013 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:51, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before
the experiment about his personal future location, the
experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the
personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an
unavoidable uncertainty."
And the situations are very different because prior to
teleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent
to both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, one
at either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?
Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the
probability of me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of
me being in Washington is zero, because I am going to be destroyed.
Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is
one and the probability of me being in Washington is one, because
there are going to be two of me.
Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.
The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world
splits, and by this I mean that in each branch your body maintains
all the quantum entanglements. In the teleporter it is only the
classical structure of you that can be duplicated (no cloning) and
so all the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can end
up in two classically different places). Of course that all
depends on assuming MWI is true. Sometimes I think it is a little
ironic that the advocates of MWI reduce everything to computation/
information - but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic interpretation
of QM in order to support it.
Good point, which I would say depends on exactly how the teleporter
actually works. (Are we, for the sake of argument, assuming
"Heisenberg compensators" ? :-)
I assume that in comp the substitution level is assumed to be above
the level of quantum entanglement - indeed, all that has to be
duplicated is the data structure that is (supposedly) stored in
your brain. That is presumably classical data, not qubits. So the
same argument would apply if a copy of you is made in a computer.
That's what must be assumed for the teleporter to work. But then
Bruno hypothesizes that the world is made of computations (by the UD)
Not really. I assume only that our brain is Turing emulable (in a
large sense of brain). Then I explain why if that is the case, there
is no world made of computations, there are only computations,
determining consciousness flux, and physical realities are invariant
pattern in such consciousness flux. I take into account that a
universal turing machine cannot distinguish anything (computable or
not) from a diophantine approximation of its local history, so that
physics is build from the statistical appearance on infinities of
diophantine equations, or more simply any one universal.
at the most fundamental level which means at the quantum level (or
lower) and the quantum uncertainty comes from the uncertainty of you
being 'duplicated' in MW.
More precisely, of you multiplied in infinities of solutions of a
Diophantine universal equation (to put it in this way).
The point being that this is not true, but that 1) it follows from
comp, and 2) it is testable/refutable.
This is of course pushing the idea of the brain as digital computer
(or emulable by one) as far as it will go, to see if the wheels
come off. The question is, do they?
I don't think so, but it's not completely clear to me. For one
thing both the brain and the digital computer are (if comp is right)
classical objects.
Only above the substitution level (an that's part of hat we have still
to justify, the apparent winning of many classical universal machines).
That means from a quantum view they must be represented by "bundles"
or "threads" of computations (like Feynman paths) to take account
of all the entanglement with the environment that makes them (quasi)
classical. This entanglement will be different when you plug and
electronic artificial neuron in place of a biological one.
Presumably this doesn't make any significant difference in 'you',
but it *could* make a difference in some circumstance and the
arguments to dispense with the physical seems to rely on
anticipating all those possible counterfactuals. Which is why I
suspect you can't dispense with the physical even if it's not
fundamental.
Absolutely. Although with comp this is not entirely clear in "near
death" state and in some possible persistent dreamy states.
At some point "physical" has to be made more precise, and for the
machine, I suspect three different notions of physical. Life and
(some) afterlife may have different physics, for example. We must dig
deeper in machine's theology.
Quantization appears, with p sigma_1 arithmetical, on the knower (Bp &
p), the observer (Bp & Dt), the feeler (Bp & Dt & p).
Comp compromises with Everett and Fuchs-Pauli, we have many relative
states of mind, distributed in arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
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