On 01 Oct 2013, at 22:20, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:59 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics, even in pure Newtonian
physics subjective indeterminacy exists because of lack of
information. If you knew the exact speed things were moving at and
the coefficient of friction and the aerodynamic drag on the ball in
a Roulette Wheel you could figure out what number the wheel would
produce, but you don't so the number is indeterminate for you. Big
deal.
> You miss the nuance between the origin of the indeterminacies,
The origin of the indeterminacies is the random use of personal
pronouns
?
with no clear referents by Bruno Marchal such that all questions
like "what is the probability "I" will do this or that?" become
meaningless.
Most of the time it's OK to be sloppy with pronouns because the
referents are obvious, but NOT in philosophical discussions about
the nature of personal identity.
We need no more "personal identity" notion than we need to say I will
survive with an artficial brain, or by using simple teleportation.
Then, as you said yourself, we need only the fact that those
remembering having been the guy in Helsinki have the right to do so.
You try to evade the indeterminacy by making it into an ambiguity, but
at the same time, you have accepted that it is (phenomenologically)
equivalent with throwing a coin. So you fail to be consistent.
All that can be said is that from ANY point of view there is a 100%
chance the Helsinki man will turn into the Washington man, and a
100% chance the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man; so if
"I" is the Helsinki man then there is a 0% chance "I" will see
either city because very soon "I" will turn into something that is
not "I".
That contradicts many posts you sent. In particular, this would mean
that duplication entails death, but then simple teleportation too, and
the digital mechanist assumption in the cognitive science (comp)
becomes wrong.
>> You want me to give you a algorithm that can generate important
information with absolutely nothing to work with? I have no such
algorithm.
> If you don't have an algorihm,
The only algorithm I have or need is that from ANY point of view if
the Helsinki man sees Moscow then the Helsinki man will turn into
the Moscow man, and if the Helsinki man sees Washington then the
Helsinki man will turn into the Washington man. What else do you
want to know?
That is not to bad, but fail to appreciate the need to evaluate the
chance of some first person events. If you don't have an algorithm,
you have an indeterminacy and make my point. You know in advance that
you will stay alive in both city, but that you will feel being in only
one city.
> then, given that you have agreed that you will survive (not die)
in that experience,
Yes I agree.
> and given that you have agreed all possibilities are lived as
unique by the continuers,
Yes, I agree.
> this confession means that you do agree there is an uncertainty.
Huh? Uncertainty about what?
Uncertainty in Helsinki about which city you will see from your future
first person experience.
> Please proceed to step 4,
No thanks.
> or explain why you do not want to proceed
Because step 3 sucks.
Why? You have not yet make a convincing point on this.
> In step 4, you are still read and annihilated in Helsinki, the
information to build the copy are still sent to Washington and
Moscow, but in Moscow the reconstitution is delayed for one year.
I don't see what a delay has to do with the price of eggs.
> What do you expect to live when pushing on the button
Who cares, expectations have nothing to do with identity or the
sense of self.
Which is another topic. See my paper "Mechanism and Personal Identity"
if interested in that topic, and create a new thread if you have
question on that. The reversal phsyics/machine-psychology-theology use
only the idea that anyone having your exact memory, character,
personality, can be said to be you, and by assumption this is
preserved with the protocol of the thought experiments.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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