On 07 Oct 2013, at 06:24, chris peck wrote:
Hi Brent
>> This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.
If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next.
I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things
remain the same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't
flow. Or the human body has an underlying form and structure that
gets maintained as the constituent matter comes and goes. It is the
abstract relationship between elements that constitutes identity
rather than the elements themselves. I would think this reading of
Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a neo-patonist. I
would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he
would really be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural
numbers from which 'shadows of us' are derived.
In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in
comp. This is the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he
violates in step 3.
Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say
"no" to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?
Bruno
>> I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as
assigning a probability.
Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he
explicitly assigns probability:
"This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-
indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable
without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable
to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow
(resp. Washington).”
All the best
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as
you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.
This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If
comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at
least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right,
you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I
thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If
comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least
in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly.
Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated
inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the
size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show
what is possible in principle. Or is "in principle" itself
objectionable?)
JC should read this:
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning
a probability.
Brent
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit
pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is
computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical
possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the
multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)
--
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
