On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:27 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of >>> >>> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 >>> >> >> From the paper: >> >> "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 >> is a >> good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so >> far. So >> she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. >> There >> is nothing left for her to be uncertain about. >> What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I >> invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 >> should >> expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect >> to see >> spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not >> that >> she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)" >> >> >> But this is where the basis problem comes in. >> > > The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under > special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we > find ourselves in this particular "now"? > > I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to > within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain > doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only > limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular > conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time. > > > That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the > brain have access to this and not that? > I am not really following what question you are asking. Are you asking why the brain state is isolated, or why we (who are here) are not experiencing the them (over there)? > Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they > are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being "this > world". > The brain is a classical computer operating on classical information. It does not operate upon or process qubits so I don't see any reason it should be conscious of its multiplicity. The information patters in differently conscious brains are not accessible. > But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical > - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. > > Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand? I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things. > > > > >> Why is the experience classical? Why doesn't Alice simply experience >> the superposition? >> > > There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different > experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have > decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information > exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the > experiences of the others. > > >> Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently >> inexperiential? >> > > Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago > "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents > in other times. > > > But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a > state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM > is time symmetric. The question is why does "experience" adhere only with > these certain states which we call 'classical'. > I think Ron Garrett gives a good explanation for this. In short, measurement and entanglement are the same phenomenon. See this part where he describes quantum information theory: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc&t=46m25s Jason > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
