On 29 Oct 2013, at 17:07, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
What are the 8 hypostases? I've seen this referred to a few other
times on this list and have never really known what it refers to.
It is eight intensional variants of Gödel's arithmetical predicate,
that all self-referentially correct machines (rich enough, believing
or using the induction axioms, Löbian, ...) inherits from
incompleteness.
They are all equivalent, in the sense that they access to exactly the
same part of arithmetical truth, but they obeys quite different logic,
and those logics provides meta-definition of the points of view.
I have used them also to offer a toy arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus' theology, so here there are, B is the modal box representing
beweisbar, and D is ~B~(and can be read "consistent").
The three primary hypostases:
p (the ONE, arithmetical truth)
Bp (the Intellect, or Intelligible) Gödel's beweisbart('p'), the 3p
self)
Bp & p (the knower, the Soul, the 1p self)
The two matters
Bp & Dt (the Intelligible Matter)
Bp & Dt & p (the Sensible Matter)
Three of them split, by the Solovay G/G* splitting, so that for them
the true logic differs from the justfifiable logic (useful for qualia,
and other qualitative aspects available to the machine).
This gives the 8 (main) hypostases.
They are explained in the second part of the sane04 paper, perhaps
with other terms,
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
and also in my Plotinus paper (here is the PDF):
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
Ask any question. You need some familiarity with incompleteness, but
those modal logics really sum up a large part of the incompleteness
consequences, for machines and many other entities.
UDA, and the comp hypothesis is translated in arithmetic by
restricting p to the sigma_1 sentence. This replace truth with sigma_1
truth. That makes The soul, the intelligible and the sensible matter
obeying a quantum-like logic. The soul by itself obeys an intuitionist
logic, and a quantum intuitionist logic for the sensible matter.
Bruno
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:30:26 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:08:16 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the
>> molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my
>> opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information.
>>
>> I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be
>> seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular
>> cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell.
>>
>> Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are
>> any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular
>> organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to
>> cooperate in what is ourself.
>>
>> Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level
>> is lower than some thought.
>>
>> Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's
>> still too much an aristotelian way to express the "identity"
>> thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of
>> person associated to machines, when those person develop *some*
>> true belief.
>>
>> So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and
numbers?
>
> Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-
> referential means, like quarks.
>
> How do you know? From the article, dendrites seem to be doing what
> (we think that) a neuron does.
We can' know. An why would not a dendrite be a puppet manipulated by
neurons.
My hand might have a more complex behavior than a dendrite, yet I do
not consider my hand as a person.
>
> relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not
> people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive
abilities.
>
> What do they emerge into,
Into person, or people.
> given they lack sensory abilities?
Like molecules or elementary particles and waves.
The person, including the sensory abilities, is what emerge. To be
more correct, the person is just the universal person, already in
Platonia, described by the 8 hypostases, and which quickly believes
itself to be a particular person when forgetting where she comes from.
The sensory abilities are well described by the universal person
canonically associated to the universal machine, in his "Bp & Dt & p"
discourse, notably.
The waves, the molecules, eventually the number relations
particularize, or incarnate, the person in different context, but they
don't create the person, nor produce consciousness. (I assume comp, of
course).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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