On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 5:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:22, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> >>> I know a single concept of people.... >>> >>> I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I >>> manage >>> (either philosophical or not) >>> >>> Have they rights? >> >> >> This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate >> how the concept of "people" is difficult and fluid. > > > > I would define a person any entity which behaves in a way which makes me > think there is some first person view. > Protozoa and perhaps even bacteria, gives me already that felling. I would > say that a person is any entity which makes love and reproduce, like most > bacteria. > > > > > >> >> Past issues: >> - Are other races people, do they have right? > > > I guess bacteria benefits from some natural bacteria right, but nature is > known to be cruel in that respect. probably a good thing, because the > universe would be quickly full of amoeba is they all manage to survive all > their duplications ... > Of course bacteria does not need human right in the usual sense of the > expression. > > > > >> Depressingly, until the >> middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human >> beings are people with equal rights. > > > That's a very recent idea, indeed. > > > >> >> Current issues: >> - Are animals people to some degree? > > > With my definition above, they are people. We just don't notice, except > children. Of course you can call that a pathetic fallacy. It is still better > to attribute too much personhood than to few, ethically. > > > >> Do they have rights? Many modern >> societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a >> crime; > > > All persons deserve respect, even when we eat them. > > > >> - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have >> rights like free speech; > > > In my opinion, this is not in the interest of the human individual and it is > a threat to the human right. > But it is in the interest of some possible multi-humans higher level being. > > > >> >> Future issues: >> - Are aliens people? > > > I would say by definition, unless you call a meteor an alien. > > > > >> Should they have equal rights? > > > Does Alien have the right to eat us? (in case they find us tasty) > > > > > >> Does that depend >> on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw >> the line? >> - Are robots people? > > > If they run the right self-referentially correct loop. > > This is something the humans will do with caution, as you get quickly > machines fighting for social security and rights. > > > > >> - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? > > > That's the comp assumption. > > > >> >> Crazy issues: >> - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. > > > Is it so crazy? After all some non Turing emulable arithmetical relations > are Löbian too. Second order arithmetic is not Turing emulable, and is > Löbian, with a "divine" "provability" predicate (to use Boolos terming!). > Normally, they have even the same fundamental physics. > Arithmetic is full of lives, dreams, but there is still place for spirit and > daemon. > Now, if mathematicians can be said to communicate with them, it is not in > any sense compatible with giving them right. They might have possible role > in making those right even possible, like arithmetical truth (which is > itself such entities, despite not being Löbian at all) makes person and > relative realties possible. > > > > >> >> Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: >> "Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... >> What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can >> be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under..." >> >> So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear >> cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has >> a meaning closer to "person" then "man". So I actually made a mistake, >> Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they >> wouldn't disagree to much on this. > > > Yes. > > > To be sure, I don't like the idea of Übermensch. > > At least we know there is no Übermachine. > > There is just a universal baby god (the universal person/machine)
But this is how I see the concept of Übermensch. The idea got horribly distorted by subsequent political events. The ideal of Übermensch is a human that transcends the illusion and becomes aware of it's true (1p) nature. I also see it as close to Buddhist ideas. Telmo. > which lost > himself in the infinite and infinitely tricky garden provided by his Mom > Goddess (Arithmetical truth). > > Bruno > > > >> >> Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person >> >> Telmo. >> >>> >>> 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack >>>>> self-referential >>>>> means, like quarks. >>>>> >>>>> Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi >>>>> fridge's >>>>> food. >>>> >>>> >>>> You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to >>>> share the same string of characters and call it an argument. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the >>>>>>> molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my >>>>>>> opinion >>>>>>> (from diverse reading) handle to information. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be >>>>>>> seen >>>>>>> as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a >>>>>>> liver >>>>>>> cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are >>>>>>> any >>>>>>> each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is >>>>>>> ourself. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> lower than some thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's >>>>>>> still >>>>>>> too much an aristotelian way to express the "identity" thesis. >>>>>>> Consciousness >>>>>>> is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to >>>>>>> machines, >>>>>>> when those person develop *some* true belief. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack >>>>>> self-referential >>>>>> means, like quarks. >>>>>> relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not >>>>>> people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups >>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an >>>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups >>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an >>>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Alberto. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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