On 06 Nov 2013, at 23:06, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 11:02 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 7 November 2013 10:52, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 10:42 PM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Liz, that depends on how you employ MUH. I use MUH in both the universes
and
the metaverse in my cosmology.
Its use in the Metaverse results in massive particles with energy as
well as
the big bang and the spacetime of each universe.
Its use in each universe results in consciousness when the complexity of biological cells exceeds the informational capacity of the universe,
which
amounts to a dualism.

This is an interesting idea. So you would say that the mind supervenes
on more computations than we can be aware of in our universe?


How can the complexity of biological cells exceed the information capacity
of the universe? Is there any evidence that this is the case?

I interpreted it as exceeding the information capacity of some
observable universe we live in but not the multiverse, but let's see
what Richard says. If my interpretation is correct, this appears to be
compatible with Bruno's idea of mind supervening on infinite
computations -- if I understand that idea correctly too.

The multiverse, or the everything type of global structure has 0 information, as it gives all alternatives. I think it is the basic motivation for the everythingers. Likewise the UD has zero, of close to zero information, like the axioms of RA, say. You have this already with the WM duplication: there is no bits generated in the third person view, yet, each copies get one bit of information, for free (except for the annihilation in case the "original" is annihilated as this demands some energy). In QM, we can also have a physical structure with zero information, and yet its relative partial substructures can get information. Richard's theory is dualist, and, as he seems aware, that is probably not compatible with computationalism.

Bruno




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to