Dear Bruno,
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Dear Stephen, > > On 01 Jan 2014, at 16:35, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > > I think that we should start with 1p - the solipsist - as fundamental > and then work from there to solve the problem of the other which will give > us a 3p. > > > > That's for woman and engineers. The doer. > Imagine that! I will not take that statement as an insult. I am actually interested in the possibility of "artificial intelligence" as a reality, so these questions are not just an intellectual exercise. > It is only the right brain, and in a manner were you will not find any two > different right brains ever agreeing. > So? I am OK with a consensus definition of truth. As I see things, we can derive the Platonic notion of trust by defining Absolute Truth as that which is incontrovertible for all possible entities. Finite worlds that have finite signal propagation speeds and finite resource accessibility don't care about Platonia. > > Once you say "yes" to the doctor, you don't even need to define the 1p, > just believe it is conserved for 3p transform of the body. > Let's say that I built a computer system and showed you the theoretical basis for a claim that it will be self-aware. Will you switch it on? I am serious! > > But then in the ideal case of correct machine, defining rational beliefs > by provability, the definition of knowledge, and thus of the knower, given > by Theaetetus reappears!. > > Computationalism provides 3p accounts on the 1p, by computer science and > the self-referential logics G and G* and their intensional variants. > Honestly, Bruno. Could you try some other equivalent explanation other than your "canonical"? I like Louis Kauffman's Eigenforms. > > > With comp we accept the others and the 3p, and science can only build on > that. The 1p is personal, private, non definable. I agree it is > ultrafundamental, and comp illustrates its role in the physical selection, > but it is not a primitive concept in the basic ontology. Computer science > gives them on a plateau. > I worry that science here has become "scientism". > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 31 Dec 2013, at 19:59, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> Dear Bruno, >> >> Is a 3p view necessarily an ontological primitive? >> >> >> >> OF course: no. Only the one we assume at the start. >> >> But an ontological primitive is arguably necessarily 3p in the scientific >> explanation of the 1p, or on anything. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If we follow Wheeler's reasoning there is no such thing! >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 1:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 31 Dec 2013, at 17:44, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>> >>> Jason, >>>> >>>> Not quite. The CONTENTS of conscious are the results of computations. >>>> >>> >>> This is ambiguous, and I am not sure you are using the standard sense of >>> "computations". >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The FACT of consciousness itself, that the computations are conscious, >>>> is due to the self-manifesting nature of reality as explained in the other >>>> post. >>>> >>> >>> Does it help you to answer "yes" or "no" to the doctor who propose you >>> an artificial brain simulating your brain or body at some level of >>> substitution? >>> >>> Is the functioning of a brain Turing emulable, in your theory? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> The rest of your questions don't follow. The fact that reality is real >>>> and actually exists means it must be present. >>>> >>> >>> It means *a* reality is present. *the* reality is the problem, what we >>> search, using this or that theories. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> That presence of reality self-manifests as the shared common present >>>> moment we all experience our existence within, which is the shared locus of >>>> reality, and that present moment is the only locus of reality. Therefore no >>>> block time, no MW, etc. >>>> >>> >>> In the first person view. Not necessarily in the 3p view, and it should >>> be better so, I think, to avoid solipsism and mono-dream. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ >>> topic/everything-list/7G5zm5OFT0k/unsubscribe. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Kindest Regards, >> >> Stephen Paul King >> >> Senior Researcher >> >> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >> >> stephe...@provensecure.com >> >> http://www.provensecure.us/ >> >> >> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of >> the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain >> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and >> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >> attorney work product. 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If you are not the intended recipient, you are > hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of > this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this > message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message > immediately.” > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/7G5zm5OFT0k/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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