Dear Stephen,
On 01 Jan 2014, at 16:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I think that we should start with 1p - the solipsist - as
fundamental and then work from there to solve the problem of the
other which will give us a 3p.
That's for woman and engineers. The doer. It is only the right brain,
and in a manner were you will not find any two different right brains
ever agreeing.
Once you say "yes" to the doctor, you don't even need to define the
1p, just believe it is conserved for 3p transform of the body.
But then in the ideal case of correct machine, defining rational
beliefs by provability, the definition of knowledge, and thus of the
knower, given by Theaetetus reappears!.
Computationalism provides 3p accounts on the 1p, by computer science
and the self-referential logics G and G* and their intensional variants.
With comp we accept the others and the 3p, and science can only build
on that. The 1p is personal, private, non definable. I agree it is
ultrafundamental, and comp illustrates its role in the physical
selection, but it is not a primitive concept in the basic ontology.
Computer science gives them on a plateau.
Bruno
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 31 Dec 2013, at 19:59, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Is a 3p view necessarily an ontological primitive?
OF course: no. Only the one we assume at the start.
But an ontological primitive is arguably necessarily 3p in the
scientific explanation of the 1p, or on anything.
Bruno
If we follow Wheeler's reasoning there is no such thing!
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 1:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 31 Dec 2013, at 17:44, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Jason,
Not quite. The CONTENTS of conscious are the results of computations.
This is ambiguous, and I am not sure you are using the standard
sense of "computations".
The FACT of consciousness itself, that the computations are
conscious, is due to the self-manifesting nature of reality as
explained in the other post.
Does it help you to answer "yes" or "no" to the doctor who propose
you an artificial brain simulating your brain or body at some level
of substitution?
Is the functioning of a brain Turing emulable, in your theory?
The rest of your questions don't follow. The fact that reality is
real and actually exists means it must be present.
It means *a* reality is present. *the* reality is the problem, what
we search, using this or that theories.
That presence of reality self-manifests as the shared common
present moment we all experience our existence within, which is the
shared locus of reality, and that present moment is the only locus
of reality. Therefore no block time, no MW, etc.
In the first person view. Not necessarily in the 3p view, and it
should be better so, I think, to avoid solipsism and mono-dream.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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