On 31 Dec 2013, at 19:59, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

  Is a 3p view necessarily an ontological primitive?


OF course: no. Only the one we assume at the start.

But an ontological primitive is arguably necessarily 3p in the scientific explanation of the 1p, or on anything.

Bruno






If we follow Wheeler's reasoning there is no such thing!


On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 1:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 31 Dec 2013, at 17:44, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Jason,

Not quite. The CONTENTS of conscious are the results of computations.

This is ambiguous, and I am not sure you are using the standard sense of "computations".





The FACT of consciousness itself, that the computations are conscious, is due to the self-manifesting nature of reality as explained in the other post.

Does it help you to answer "yes" or "no" to the doctor who propose you an artificial brain simulating your brain or body at some level of substitution?

Is the functioning of a brain Turing emulable, in your theory?






The rest of your questions don't follow. The fact that reality is real and actually exists means it must be present.

It means *a* reality is present. *the* reality is the problem, what we search, using this or that theories.





That presence of reality self-manifests as the shared common present moment we all experience our existence within, which is the shared locus of reality, and that present moment is the only locus of reality. Therefore no block time, no MW, etc.

In the first person view. Not necessarily in the 3p view, and it should be better so, I think, to avoid solipsism and mono-dream.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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