On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com
<mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>> wrote:
The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is
that any and
all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially, the
articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena
- can at
least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be
so, it
is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours
could
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its
existence
granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder would be
redundant in the
explanation of such behaviour, but that it is hardly possible to see
how an
inner dual could even be accessible in principle to a complete (i.e.
causally
closed) extrinsic system of reference in the first place.
Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal
closure.
But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in fact blind to
such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to John Clark, if we rely on the
causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some level, of any
behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my
point above is that the problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to
a paradox.
The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view that the very
thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to refer to irreducibly conscious
phenomena must also be fully explicable extrinsically. But how then could any such
sequence of extrinsic events possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed
circle of explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty
"the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very
assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything to do) with
the fact that I am conscious!
I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,
But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me that Bruno's
computational theory avoids this paradox. It seems there will still, in the UD
computation, be a closed account of the physical processes. No doubt it will be
computationally linked with some provable sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify
with beliefs. But this still leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes;
even if comp explains them both.
Brent
although it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because of its very
intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David
Chalmers, for example, acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer
any solution and then proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read
perhaps you should - deals with it a little more explicitly in A Place for
Consciousness, but IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact I
know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it head-on and suggests at
least the shape of a possible solution. That said, do you see what the paradox is and if
you do, how specifically does your theory deal with it?
David
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
