On Thursday, January 30, 2014 12:19:56 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net <javascript:>> > wrote: > > On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is > that > >>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, > crucially, > >>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious > phenomena > >>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But > if > >>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such > extrinsic > >>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, > even > >>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated > remainder > >>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it > is > >>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in > >>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of > reference > >>> in the first place. > >> > >> > >> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of > causal > >> closure. > > > > > > But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT > in > > fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to > John > > Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and > which > > of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be > > such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might > otherwise > > wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the > > problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a > paradox. > > > > The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the > view > > that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to > refer > > to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable > > extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events > > possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of > > explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute > > certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to > accept > > that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, > cannot > > have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious! > > > > I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, > > > > > > But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me that > > Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox. It seems there will > > still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical > processes. > > No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences, > > which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still leaves > > beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains > > them both. > > I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon. > If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with > (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems > arise. >
Then you would still have the problem of why there are epiphenomema. They are already "an extra thing" with no functional explanation. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
