On 18 February 2014 03:42, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > <snip> > > I have over and over. If I count my fingers, I get a number five. That > number cannot reproduce the individual fingers and thumb of my hand. It's > just a metaphor for a certain set of qualities associated with feeling and > seeing my hand. There's the example of suits of cards being unnecessary to > simulate all of the card games that exist. There's the example of sports > being unlike games based only on mathematical rules because sports involves > the limitations of the participants overcoming subjective aesthetics of > pain and weakness to execute plays in the first place. There's the example > of typefaces being unlike ASCII text, and timbre of a musical performance > being unlike the sequence of notes on a page of sheet music. I can go on > and on... How do you justify your counter claim? Do you really understand > the mathematical argument you are supporting or are you just impressed that > you can even understand part of it so it seems glamorous? > Well, the UDA is a logical argument based on a specific premise (the computational theory of mind) and its purpose is to investigate rigorously the consequences of that premise, which are typically rather obfuscated in the literature. It is those consequences that are claimed to necessitate the reversal of physics and machine psychology. Not every step of the argument is uncontroversial, as the debate on this list gives testimony, but the to-and-fro has been instructive (at least to me) on the probable disposition of the issues. The mathematical analysis is highly specialised, at least in detail, and none of my references in our discussion have been to anything more than the general conceptual categories appealed to in that analysis, insofar as I can claim to have any mastery of them at this point. That said, it has been the diligent consideration of those categories over time that has led to my being much less certain that the puzzling categorical distinctions you refer to above are insoluble in a computational theory. I think, frankly, that wrangling over the possible references of terms like primordial and fundamental are beside the point. There is no question that any theory that doesn't dismiss consciousness at the outset (which In my view is simply incoherent) has to deal with its categorical distinctiveness from any possible functional description. But by the same token no such theory can avoid the heavy lifting of elucidating a lawful reciprocity between these two domains without trivialising the problems and even paradoxes that this entails. If comp led to a denial of the primordial nature of consciousness, in the sense I believe you intend, I would also be forced to reject it out of hand. But that does not seem to be the case, contrary to what I once imagined. What comp (if correct) seems rather to lead to is a principled account of the functional correlates of conscious actors. Such an account encompasses the functional claims of such actors to private acquaintance with a world of appearance filtered from the totality of computation. But the very logic of this account entails that it must always fail to capture an ineliminable gap between these claims and acquaintance per se. Moreover, that very failure must be strikingly apparent to the functional actors themselves. We might indeed say that whatever abides in this gap is primordial: it is not "created" by anything prior to it; but then no more are its functional correlates. Rather one might say that comp is a primordial account of the means by which that gap and its categorically unique contents are pulled into focus by a functional lens, if I may be permitted a metaphor of my own. My interest in comp does not preclude a desire to understand alternative theories; quite the opposite. It's just that I've managed to learn something distinctive from Bruno because of his dogged persistence in sticking to the point in discussion, whereas I cannot honestly say that I've had the same experience in discussions with you to this point. I'm perfectly willing to entertain the thought that this is because of some deficiency in me (god knows there are enough) but for me, your flights of metaphor raise more questions than they seem capable of answering. Perhaps Bruno's style of reasoning just suits my way of understanding things. David > >> >> >>> It is like taking the color wheel and saying that since values of HSV >>> can me mapped to it, then knowing HSV coordinates will allow a blind person >>> to see color. >>> >> >> But this analogy suggests itself only because you have decided a priori >> to disbelieve some body that claims to be able to see what you can and >> behaves perfectly consistently with these claims. >> > > The difference is that I did not build the person out of mechanical parts > specifically to be able to say that. It's not like Watson showed up in a > turnip patch knowing how to play Jeopardy, or a ton of Barbie dolls showed > up in a pit mine somewhere. When we go about trying to specifically break > down our intellect into intellectual elements, we cannot be surprised that > when we arrange them in the way that reminds us most of ourselves the same > intellectual correspondences that we are familiar with appear reflected > back to us. I submit that this property of reflection, similar to what is > found in divination and quantum mechanics is the true fabric of everything. > > >> >>> <snip> >>> >>>> >>>>> References to Kool-Aid generally have to do with its availability in >>>>> Guyana, rather than the US. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Ah, I hadn't made the connection with Jonestown. What a revolting >>>> comparison. >>>> >>> >>> It's a pretty common idiom in the US. Or it was. >>> >> >> That doesn't make the comparison any the less revolting. >> > > Sure, but it's an effective reminder of how we can be deceived by false > hope. > > >> >> >>> <snip> >>> >>> >>>> As I argue above, this does not entail any discrimination between the >>>> two as to which is the more fundamental; if anything it is the entire >>>> system of reciprocity that is fundamental, in a Platonic rather than an >>>> Aristotelian sense. >>>> >>> >>> "it is the entire system of reciprocity that is fundamental" >>> >>> YESSS. I call that 'system' sense. Only its not a 'system', because a >>> system can only function if there is a sensible context in which systemic >>> qualities can be experienced. >>> >> >> Just so. Now if you reflect on this remark perhaps you may get an inkling >> of where your general ideas and Bruno's schema might intersect. >> > > Our ideas intersect everywhere except where his view is that sense is a > kind of arithmetic mechanism, and I say that arithmetic and mechanism are a > diminished category of sense. > > >> >> <snip> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> but sensory experience doesn't fall out of either one - not unless >>>>> you smuggle the possibility of it in before the fact. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But that is not necessarily so, as I argue above. I must admit that it >>>> used to seem obvious to me that this must be so, and indeed the force of >>>> arguments like Searle's depend on this native intuition, or common sense if >>>> you prefer. My position was that sense is sui generis and irreducible and >>>> that neither of these characteristics could conceivably be successfully >>>> captured by any objective model except as an optional extra that could just >>>> as easily be omitted. But I am less certain of that now, and the reasons >>>> for this stem from a range of considerations that tend to the same >>>> conclusion. I've mentioned some of these before, but perhaps chief amongst >>>> them is the fact that the entities captured by comp plead for their own >>>> incontrovertible access to indexical truth precisely as we do ourselves and >>>> hence to deny them that truth begins to seem tantamount to solipsism, or >>>> worse. I can't absolutely rule out the possibility that I'm merely >>>> succumbing to some arithmetical version of the pathetic fallacy, but I no >>>> longer think that this is as "obvious" as it might at first appear. >>>> >>> >>> I agree that it is not obvious, but that is only because we are bumping >>> up against a new understanding. When 'Birth of a Nation' was first shown in >>> theaters, people jumped out of the way of the train on the screen. We are >>> not dealing with an obvious form of puppetry which exploits 3D syntax, this >>> is orders of magnitude more sophisticated. The computational ventriloquist >>> exploits 4D tropes which are at or exceed the level of public awareness >>> that we are accustomed to. It's hypermechanism - more akin to something >>> like automatic writing or a Ouija board than a conventional program. Of >>> course its going to reflect the common sense which all 4D experiences share >>> - but it reflects them generically and impersonally. There is nobody home. >>> It is a commercial storefront. >>> >> >> I'm afraid that all the above remarks make clear to me is the peril of >> becoming intoxicated by one's own facility with metaphor. >> > > Metaphor is the key. Computation doesn't do metaphor, it does semaphore. > For metaphor you need aesthetic experience and an intention to compare them > purely for the pleasure of doing so. > > >> >> <snip> >> >>> >>> It is infinitely easy, because aesthetic qualities are not necessarily >>> limited. There is nothing to prevent sense from making itself form-like, so >>> it is form-like. >>> >>> >>>> As I suggest above we need to do more than propose some vaguely >>>> plausible connection between function and appearance; we need to elucidate >>>> a principled reciprocity between them, or at least the general shape of >>>> one. >>>> >>> >>> The general shape is tessellated, non-orientable, anomalous symmetry. It >>> is the relation of literal to figurative, spatial to narrative, entropy to >>> significance, etc. >>> >> >> I seem to lack any relevant reference points with which to make sense of >> all this unfamiliar terminology. I was rather hoping you might begin at >> some common point of departure that we could agree upon and attempt to >> proceed step-wise from there. >> > > It seems like your only offer of a common point is that I should begin > with the possibility of assuming that I am completely wrong (for no > particularly compelling reason). > > >> >> <snip> >>> >>> >>>> This is where I think panpsychist ideas tend most often to reveal their >>>> lack of traction on the core problems and indeed it is why I gave up on >>>> them. Just how are we to suppose such primitive sensory-motive interactions >>>> relate to everything else that we seek to explain? Are we to suppose that >>>> they are simply the interiority of what manifests as exterior interactions? >>>> >>> >>> Yes, what manifests locally as exterior (to our body) is actually >>> interior in an absolute sense (to eternity). >>> >> >> That what manifests locally as exterior (to our body) is actually >> interior is not in dispute; witness the discussion with Stathis. >> > > Then why are you asking incredulously if we are to suppose that awareness > is simply the interior of bodies? Now you are agreeing with me that it is > bodies which are the interior of experience. Ok, we agree. There's your > common point of departure if you like. > > >> >> >>> >>>> If so, this might suggest a sort of primitive inner view of physics, >>>> but what further motive is there to conclude that any arrangement of >>>> micro-views carved at those particular joints would result in a >>>> qualitatively singularised view of a macroscopic world? >>>> >>> >>> Think of how the pixels of a screen render a singular image. It isn't >>> that they are joining together and producing an image, but the complete >>> opposite. We are eliding the differences between the pixels - we substitute >>> a richer aesthetic whole from the fertility of our own perspective by >>> ignoring low level partitions. >>> >> >> But this passes much too quickly over the question of who or what is >> eliding these differences >> > > Who and what are on the same level as the experience of eliding. They are > all features of nested layers of sense experience. Any who or what would > only refer back to a deeper level of sense itself. > > >> and, more particularly, how. If you can actually propose any kind of >> principled (i.e. not merely poetically suggestive) >> > > No, it's the poetically suggestive which is Absolute. That is the reality. > The principled schemas are local, disposable technologies. > > >> schema for how "pixels" at the level of strings, atoms, molecules, cells >> etc. might be understood as merging or resolving into a singularised, >> macroscopic appearance of a world complete with thoughts and feelings, I >> would venture to suggest that this might ultimately be hailed as the >> greatest single insight since Darwin's. Can you? >> > > The insight is that the relation is more primitive than the laws of > physics, even of ontology itself. This relation of object to subject is > more primitive than A=A or the word "the". These are the symmetries upon > which both arithmetic and God supervene. There is no how, there is no what > or why, those are all miles down the line. These are the question of > serious minds, but serious minds have no stomach for the truth about > consciousness. The absurdity of consciousness is not accessible by logic, > it must be experienced directly. It is art, not science, sport, not game. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> Conceptual issues of this kind are often summarised under the grain and >>>> binding problems and I have never seen any proposed panpsychist resolution >>>> of them that really convinced me it had much traction (although I must >>>> admit that Gregg Rosenberg gets closer than most). >>>> >>> >>> The binding problem dissolves because all phenomena are bound on one >>> base level, and their appearance of disentanglement depends on the >>> constraints of insensitivity of any particular perspective. >>> >> >> Sure, why not? Suggestive metaphors are ten a penny. But how, >> specifically? >> > > There is no how. Metaphor precedes how. How do you know you are awake? > > >> >> >>> <snip> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> As to understanding your position, I am perfectly open to such an >>>> understanding if you could only help me towards it by answering questions >>>> about it as clearly and directly as you can. From what I have read of your >>>> website I would say that you are clearly aware of much of the historical >>>> material on the topic but I haven't read anything there that convinces me >>>> that you have either an original or a satisfactory take on the problems. If >>>> you wish you might start by addressing the combinatorial issues I outlined >>>> in my preceding comment. >>>> >>> >>> The combination problem stems from the limitations of our perception. >>> >> >> Virtually every problem stems from the limits of our perception. The >> question remains: how specifically to evade those limits in this particular >> case? >> > > By extending our perception. Neural implants, networked brains, induced > near death experiences... > > >> >> Space and time are forms of insensitivity, or entropy. We have to turn >>> the whole thing inside out and see public appearances as the tokenized, >>> reduced form. >>> >> >> I don't see that the idea that public appearances are a tokenized, >> reduced form - the epistemological avatars, as it were, of a veiled >> reality (to adopt a phrase of Bernard d'Espagnat) - is in dispute, modulo >> an eliminativist position on consciousness that hardly anyone on this list >> is willing to seriously argue for. Again, witness the discussion with >> Stathis. >> >> Consider the total activity of the brain over a human lifetime to be a >>> single mountain range with many peaks.The brain does not put our reality >>> together, it breaks it apart into the reality of many levels of bodies. >>> >> >> Yes, but how, specifically? >> > > By the nested limitation of sensitivity. When insensitivity is introduced, > sense is diffracted into public vs private, spatial vs temporal, discrete > vs compact, etc. We get distance and forgetting, just as we get a spectrum > from white light. The how explanation of diffraction maps to some aspects > of what we see, but in the end, what we see makes more sense of the > explanation than the explanation makes sense of what we see. > > >> Again one might speculate on how the interiority of the structure of a >> brain might fragment along the interfaces of any of its constituent parts, >> but the fact that this seems to lead anywhere but the destination we seek >> seems all too frustratingly obvious to almost everyone. >> > > I'm talking about a completely new direction in human thought, not a > complete manual for transcending the limits of the brain. What I offer is > something that points to the corner pieces of the big puzzle, not to a step > by step guide of how to find each piece and where to put it. > > >> >>> <snip> >>> >>>> >>>>> If I sound like a lawyer, it's not to evade questions, but to show why >>>>> they are irrelevant. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But you haven't succeeded in showing that. You have merely reiterated >>>> it. Over and over. >>>> >>> >>> I think that I have succeeded in expressing it adequately, but you are >>> overlooking it, over and over. Not that it would matter, but I do talk to >>> lots of people and some of them do actually get it. >>> >> >> I wish you luck with a more receptive audience. >> > > This is by far the least receptive audience I encounter anymore. Only the > atheist forum I used to frequent was more consistently opposed to > considering my perspective in any but the most superficial and impatient > way. In some forums I'm part of the majority. > > Craig > > >> >> David >> >> >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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