On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
> argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
>

So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
in doing so. No can do.

> or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability
> calculus meaningless.
>

If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with
both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be
meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum
Mechanics works as well as it does. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why
Quantum Mechanics works, that's already been done, he's trying to explain
the nature of self, and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus
works or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with
that; as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.

And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. According
to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with
your doppelganger and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns,
cause no problem; but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with
your   doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in
our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of
ASCII characters with no clear meaning.

> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain
>

I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to