On 2/18/2014 5:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 04:57:04PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Thus the notion of an external reality IS consistent with it being a
computational reality, because it leads directly to it.
Edgar
So you have just painted yourself into a Platonic idealist corner. The
only ontological properties of relevance is that of universal
computation. We could just as easily be running on the stuff of Peano
arithmetic (as Bruno suggests) as on Babbage's analytic engine in some
fantastic Steampunk scenario. Furthermore, since universal dovetailers
will dominate the measure of conscious programs, we will observe an
FPI-like screen over the activities of those programs - we must be
staring at the "Nothing" I talk about in my book. This is just a
consequence of the UDA.
But the "Nothing" is not an ontology - it is a really a statement that
ontology is unknowable, and not even really meaningful in any sense.
Does not every theory of the world have an ontology? Bruno's is computation. Just
because computation can take different but equivalent representations doesn't make it
"nothing".
Brent
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