On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:57, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world
(i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any
observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-
de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in
terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.
So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind
start from a blank state?
Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.
Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an
infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere...
This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang,
perhaps.)
Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
I see no reason to assume that.
Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to
certain physical processes?
Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw
conclusions from it!
I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content
of consciousness. The premise I took is "everyone's on their first
consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia;
and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic
you need to parse correctly.
But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing
up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you
be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the
one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the
W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are
different people.
Brent
I'd be very interested to know who in this community currently
subscribes to this idea that consciousness is not entirely a product
of evolution of the nervous system and physical
I cannot see the faintest hint of things going this way. The brain
is exactly the right conditions this extraordinary thing can be
explicable.
On the bright side, perhaps we can look on this as a distinct predict.
Bruno - what is hanging on this prediction? Are you willing to nail
the colours of your work to something hard here>?
I have nailed comp+theaetetus on something "hard", as I give the comp
quantum logic, and compare them to the one derived from observation.
That's the whole point.
Things are advancing briskly enough in brain sciences, so it's
realistic to think a resolution might emerge in the not distant
future.
That is logically impossible. Or you assume comp, and get the
conceptual solution which is almost modest as it is not much more than
"listen to the machines". What they say is already quite astonishing,
even if today this require some study of mathematical logic.
What sort of standard of proof would it take then, for you to regard
your theory falsified?
The result is that comp+theaetetus is falsified if nature contradicts
a physical comp tautology, that if a theorem of Z1*.
Or, where do your assertions about consciousness fit into your whole
theory?
I define comp with consciousness. Comp is the belief that I will keep
"my consciousness" through the use of *some* universal machine
relatively to some probable universal machine.
But the UDA use not a lot, as it uses only a sharable notion of 1p
(memory accompanying the person entering in the telebox).
Is it just a loosely associated preference, or is it absolutely
indispensable?
You judge.
Will you formalize a falsifiable prediction?
I did. The arithmetical material "hypostases", that is mainly the
arithmetical quantum logic Z1*.
(I am currently explaining this to Liz and Brent and others. You
might follow the thread, or asks for more condensed descriptions).
Bruno
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