On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world
(i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any
observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-
de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in
terms of the specifics of some particular continuation.
So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind
start from a blank state?
Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.
Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an
infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere...
This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang,
perhaps.)
Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
I see no reason to assume that.
Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to
certain physical processes?
Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw
conclusions from it!
I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content
of consciousness. The premise I took is "everyone's on their first
consciousness". For which you offered the explanation of amnesia;
and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic
you need to parse correctly.
But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing
up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you
be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the
one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the
W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are
different people.
We agree that the W-man and the M-man are different, yes.
We even agree that both the W-man and the M-man are the H-man,
admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus
don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule.
I am not sure there is any disagreement, actually, except only on
this, but even there he does not convince me. Why he stays mute on
step 4 is perhaps that he does already understand it and the
consequences, and he dislikes them, perhaps. Well, it is weird, but we
are accustom of irrationality in theology aren't we?
Bruno
Brent
Brent
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