On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 01:09:43PM +1300, LizR wrote: > On 10 March 2014 12:38, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: > > > > > But my point remains, at this point in time, intrasubjective consistency is > > not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an external reality > > independent of the process of observation, contra Edgar's claim. > > > > Even the existence of intersubjective consistency is hypothetical (doubly > so when you have to deal with teenagers...) >
Granted intersubjective consistency is a little hard to test directly. However, it is a consequence of the anthropic principle: If I am consistent with my environment (as a consequence of the AP), then so must all other observers sharing that environment. The AP is empirically quite well tested, ISTM. The Occam catastrophe issue, as discussed in my book, means that the AP, and consequently intersubjective agreement on part of observed reality is a consequence of bitstring ensemble theories. > For practical purposes we assume both intersubjective consistency and the > existence of an external reality. However when discussing ontology it's > best to remember that these are provisional hypotheses. (It's probably best > *not* to remember that while crossing the road, though!) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
