On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:32, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Is there anything in particle physics that emulates the processing
capabilities of computers, analog or digital? My question goes below
Chaitin's metabiology. Something that is a characteristic of physics.
Theoretically, you can emulate a universal computer with billiard
balls, on an infinite table. I think that classical physics needs
three bodies to emulate a universal machine. QM needs 0 bodies, as the
quantum vacuum is already Turing Universal, and even emulates
"naturally" a universal quantum dovetailer (making it into a possible
comp measure winner).
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Mar 24, 2014 2:08 pm
Subject: Re: Chaitin's Metabiology
On 23 Mar 2014, at 21:40, bs...@cornell.edu wrote:
One might note that at the end of Chapter Three (Proving Darwin)
Greg has the "caveat" "Metabiology in its present form cannot
address thinking and consciousness, fascinating those these
be." (page 21).
I do not see any reason why plants should not be included.
I think so to.
If one has the inspiration to imagine that the act of reproduction
*is like* a computation (math and philosophy different) and
abstract simply that we humans reproduce
and if one thought that all of algorithmic complexity in
metabiology (as a subect) was derived from a difference in that
biotic potential in different lineages then...
metabiology applied might not be a part of the/an algorithmic
theory of everything yet different computations that "emerge" in
different lineages would be differentiable. A machine cannot know
what computations "support it" but propagtion of species
differences is a different kind of monkey at the qwerty...I would
think and be conscious of...There are really no physical laws that
support pure metabiology (only generalized matheatical function
through arbitrary points) and the step to physical lawys engineer-
able in applied metabiology is actually a bit more than would be
for non preserved force propagations. These kinds of contained
algorithmic sets are only thus a part of what a theory of
everything etc would contain but it might be more somatically
correct even if not currently inclusive of any kind of plant or
animal. What is contained and what can exist for longer times are
different things.
OK. That is the problem, but it helps to put it in mind/body or
first-person/third person terms, and assuming, like Chaitin,
digitality put a lot of interesting constraints, especially if you
take into account tractability and resources.
My questioning is more fundamental, and eventually consists in a
translation of the mind body problem into a "stable belief in body"
problem arising in arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (but meta-
arithmetic is in some part in arithmetic: this is exploited
maximally).
Bruno
On Friday, March 21, 2014 5:26:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:18, bs...@cornell.edu wrote:
Are you still interested in talking about metabiology?
http://www.axiompanbiog.com/Pages/Metabiology.aspx
On Wednesday, November 24, 2010 2:10:42 PM UTC-5, thermo wrote:
Chaitin is currently drafting some attemps on metabiology and
biological evolution of creativity. I read the latest:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/darwin.pdf
I found it very interesting in it's simplicity.
Strong features:
- Abstract and theorems can be proved.
- Includes algorithmic mutations.
- Fitness is general enough to enable infinite evolution.
Weak features:
- Some oracles are used.
- Biological features such as replication, environment were
removed favoring more abstract concepts.
- Evolution is only associated with mathematical creativity, IA?
Can someone can explain how this theory is related to Algorithmic
Theories of Everything?
It *is* an algorithmic theory of everything, but like digital
physics, it still assumes a brain-mind identity thesis, which does
not work when you assume computationalism in the cognitive science.
It avoids the comp mind body problem, which forces us to derive the
core of the physical laws from a statistics on all computations.
It cannot work because it implies comp, and comp implies that
"reality" is a view from inside the space of all computations, and
this is not entirely reductible to an algorithm.
Like Wolfram, they still don't take into account that a machine
cannot know which computation support it, and can know she is
distributed in many computation. They miss the "Everett" aspect of
arithmetic or computer science. I would say in a nutshell.
Bruno
Cheers,
José.
--
A los hombres fuertes les pasa lo que a los barriletes; se elevan
cuando es mayor el viento que se opone a su ascenso.
José Ingenieros (1877.1925)
*thermo*
http://www.mechpoet.net
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