On 11 Jun 2014, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/11/2014 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2014 1:07 AM, LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Yeah that's pretty close, although I'd say consciousness just
occurs at a different level of description and is equally "real"
at that level. The second law of thermodynamics is "real" at the
level of thermodynamics, even though it can be seen as implied by
statistical mechanics. It is more general than any specific
statistical mechanics. I don't think p-zombies are possible, so
consciousness is a necessary aspect of some kinds of physical
processes.
So I guess that you think that consciousness is as real as the
second law, which is (as far as I know) an emergent property of
the universe having been arranged in a special way in the past
(plus the laws of physics, although I imagine most varieties of
physics would give a version of the 2nd law, given a special
arrangement of the constituents of a universe).
So it isn't really, really, really real <mime-
attachment.gif> .... but it is a good high level approximation
for -- er -- something. <mime-attachment.gif>
I put "real" in scare quotes because ontologies are relative to
theories, stories we tell to describe the world. Since we don't
even have a TOE, and if we did we couldn't know it was right, we
don't know what's "real".
Not if comp is correct, in which case a computationalist know an
infinity of equivalent TOE.
Sure, and if Christianity is correct you'll be punished for not
worshipping Yahwe.
Come on. Comp is by default reasonable and already believed by most
scientists.
As science, I know only a minority of christians interpreting
literally the text like if it was science.
he does not know them for sure, as he cannot know if comp is true,
but those who believes in comp, does know a TOE in the theaetetus
sense, if comp is true.
Further more, I'm not even sure that the reductionist program of
looking for what's most fundamental (in a TOE) and reifying it is
the right way to look at things. It leads to making strings or
numbers, which we never experience, "real" and everything we
experience (on which we base or theories) "illusory". I think
this called the error of the misplaced concrete.
In that case we are just no machine and should never accept an
artificial brain (or UDA is invalid of course).
That doesn't follow. The doctor can still make a prosthetic brain.
Then you have to assume matter, and some magical non Turing emulable
"essential" property, like its "real existence" to get consciousness
(and prevent it in the arithmetical reality). that is akin to non-
comp. It is exactly like in Everett: the math explains interfering
histories, but we select one special among them.
Are you sure we don't need to bless the prosthetic brain with some
holly water?
I don't think there is any choice in that matter, if we stick to
rationalism and bet on comp.
But there is a difference with physical reductionism, which
eliminate persons. Comp prevents such eliminative reductionism, and
invite to listen to the machine, especially on what the machine is
cautiously mute. Incompleteness provides the 1p association to the
3p machines. It is just a fact that []p & p behaves like a knower,
It's just a modal function. I don't see that it "knows" anything.
It says things and they are true. Some are deep and non trivial about
herself.
ISTM you are leaping the 3p/1p gap here in a way you consider
illegitimate for physical theories.
Except Everett, and information theory, physics does not usually
address the mind body problem.
I certainly don't consider the 3p/1p nuance illegitimate in physical
theories as I applaud it in Everett, Wheeler, Rossler, Boscovitch,
Tegmark.
But most are still unclear on what the observer's nature is, and
confuses the body and the mind, in a way not allowed if we assume
digital mechanism.
Bruno
Brent
and is (at the G* plane) the machine from the correct machine's view.
Bruno
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