On 25 Jun 2014, at 10:22, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-06-25 10:15 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 25 Jun 2014, at 09:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-06-25 6:52 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:
On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote:
On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for
consciousness, or for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the
argument above, makes that role very mysterious, so much that it
is not clear why we could still say yes to the doctor in virtue of
correct digital rendering.
You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use
matter to make your brain prosthesis.
Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be
you, so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital
copy, you really do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by
definition.
?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives
you a prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions).
Not only that, as comp stands for *computationalism* so, it also
means that whatever your mind is, it can be captured by a form of
computation... what you're defining here is functionalism (and
computationalism is of course included in functionalism, but not
the other way around).
In this list. Yes. But historically (and in many books),
"functionalism" is the term coined by H. Putnam for a particular
case of computationalism, with a brain modeled at an implicit high
level by a Turing machine(*).
Well the term predates hime; and if I look at wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)
"Its core idea is that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in
pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role - that
is, they are causal relations to other mental states, sensory
inputs, and behavioral outputs."
It tells nothing about how the function is realized... so yes
computationalism is a sort of functionalism, but functionalism is
broader... it could be that mind is not a computation but a sort of
analog machinery could replicate it, so it would be a form of
functionalism but not computationalism (or digital mechanism as I
see them both as synonym) at all.
I agree with you. Just said the original meaning. "functionalism" is
rarely used in a context using explicit non computable functions. The
term is too much broad imo. If you take all functions, then
functionalism is tautological. I think.
Bruno
Quentin
Functionalism, without computationalism, is not a doctrine, as it is
fuzzy about functions and level. You need to define the calss of
functions that are allowed. If you take all functions: it is a
basically empty.
So the term functionalism can mean 'comp' in some context (Putnam,
Cognitive science), and 'non-computationalism' (here).
You might look at:
PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A
Symposium, Sidney
Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. Repris dans
Anderson A. R. (Ed.),1964.
ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New
Jersey. Trad.
Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983.
Bruno
Quentin
It will be you even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling
for JKC that "you" is both singular and plural).
Brent
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