On 13 Jun 2014, at 02:11, David Nyman wrote:
On 12 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course most physicists think the
mind/body problem is too ill defined a problem to tackle right now.
But this is Bruno's whole point and aim, isn't it? Given that the
whole subject area is indeed a quagmire of confusion, he sets out his
stall to formulate the problem in a way that is sufficiently
well-defined, unambiguous, and mathematically precise to be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. As you know, he originally expected it to break
immediately under the resulting strain, but in practice it hasn't yet
done so.
That said, I think your remarks about primitive matter rather miss the
point. The UDA starts with the most general assumption of a
computational theory of mind: i.e. the brain is some sort of mechanism
and that the relation between consciousness and this mechanism depends
on some (unknown) set of computational relations obtaining between
some (unknown) finite collection of its physical components. One might
then say of this state of affairs that the mechanism itself is
"physically instantiated", whereas the resultant conscious states are
"computationally instantiated" (aka consciousness "qua computatio").
Step 8 is then intended, on this assumption, to make explicit the (in
retrospect, rather obvious) point that any given net physical
behaviour of such a mechanism (i.e. the disposition of its components
through any given set of physical states) can be fortuitously
preserved even after every trace of its original, purportedly
"computational", architecture has been evacuated.
If this be the case, it would seem to make little sense to continue in
the view that any conscious states correlated with the net physical
behaviour of the mechanism are still *computationally instantiated*.
Consequently, either consciousness qua computatio is false (Maudlin's
conclusion), or it is at least persuasive that both conscious states
and their correlative physical mechanisms alike depend on
"computation" in some rather deeper and more general formulation. This
is what opens the conceptual gap for the "reversal" to bite and the UD
to exert its baleful influence.
It should be clear then, under such assumptions, that neither a
conscious state, nor any local physical mechanism through which it is
manifested, can any longer be considered basic; rather, *both* must
(somehow) be complex artefacts (albeit with distinctive derivations)
of a more "primitive" (in this case, by assumption, computational)
ontology. The relevant distinction, then, is between this set of
relations and the alternative, in which both consciousness and
computation are assumed to be derivative on a more basic (hence
"primitive") formulation of matter.
Hope Brent read well those lines.
Sometimes, I think some people are just not interested in the subject
(everything including consciousness and beyond).
Bruno
David
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