On 12 Jun 2014, at 05:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/11/2014 5:53 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 June 2014 12:42, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/11/2014 5:31 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 1:27 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 6/11/2014 2:48 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
It's just a modal function. I don't see that it "knows"
anything. ISTM you are leaping the 3p/1p gap here in a way you
consider illegitimate for physical theories.
If beings for argument's sake made of some matter in physical
theories can know via exploring relations and patterns
scientifically in 3p: why would the appropriate universal
machines/numbers in comp ontology not be able to do the same?
No reason. But the same question goes both ways.
Indeed, but there might be a slight advantage for "just a
function" to relate, because that's what it does via agreed upon
terms. Whereas with an entity arising out of matter subject to
quantum logic, it's weird that it would
relate at all. Even weirder still that such entity will
intuitively tend to reason classically. PGC
If the quantum system can emulate a Turing machine, then it's no
weirder for it to be conscious than an UD.
Which is comp, isn't it? So what's wrong with Bruno's argument?
I wouldn't go so far as to way it's "wrong", but I don't find it as
conclusive as he does. First, I think it's a category confusion to
say that "Ex(x+1 = 3)" proves that 2 exists.
It does not prove that 2 exists. It means that 2 exists, if you agree
with the axioms given for elemntary arithmetic.
You can add, in the philosophical or theological context, that it
exists arithmetically. It certainly does not exist physically.
The truth of mathematical existence statements just implies that the
axioms lead to the proof that a certain predicate can be satisfied.
That's not the same "exist" as "Liz exists".
In which theory? If you assume a physical universe, and Liz in it, OK.
But this type of physical universe might not needed and introduce
unnecessary difficulties.
So there is no proof that the UD exists or even that arbitrarily
large numbers exist in the sense that you exist.
Yes, of course. We don't need that.
Second, he implies that step 8 proves that the physical is
dispensable;
Not really. Step 8 is supposed only to show that the physical, to be
*primary*, needs magical elements, of the type god-of-the-gap.
but when challenged on the point he grants that is likely that human-
like consciousness can only exist within a physical environment. So
he hasn't proven that the physical is dispensable.
On the contrary, I show that for all universal machine, from the first
person points of view, she can avoid the physical, and the
quantizations. Just that the "physical" is no more primary, but a
reflect of what is universal in the mathematical measure on the
sigma_1 sentences.
He qualifies this by saying the physical may not be dispensable, but
it isn't "the primitive physical". I think "the primitive physical"
is a strawman. It's ill defined and I don't know of anyone who
asserts it except as a working heuristic. Even the physicists he
accuses of believing in primitive matter, think that matter may be
just mathematical relations (c.f. Max Tegmark, John Wheeler) and
others think it is just a certain way to organize qualia or
knowledge (c.f. Bertrand Russell, Chris Fuchs).
And I like them. No problem. I show they are both right. I just show
the natural ways a universal machine can organize his view on the
arithmetical sigma_1 reality, and this include the physical observable.
Of course most physicists think the mind/body problem is too ill
defined a problem to tackle right now.
Instead he tries to identify consciousness as just a relation
between operators in modal logic or numbers in arithmetic.
This is like saying Einstein did only succeed in showing relation
between numbers when saying the E = mc^2.
You are not interpretating the modal box correctly. It is math of
Gödel 1931.
The similarity of relations is suggestive, but I don't see that it
proves anything; or more accurately that it proves too much. It
proves that consciousness is realized by very stupid, even trivial,
programs.
Universality is not trivial. And Löbianity neither. And the first
person knower (S4Grz(1)) neither too.
Which to me seems like changing the meaning of "consciousness". But
as I say this isn't necessarily wrong - it might be right is the
sense that it can be filled out and made into a theory with some
predictive power and consilience.
OK. Nice!
Bruno
Brent
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