On 12 Jun 2014, at 10:17, LizR wrote:
On 12 June 2014 15:09, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
I wouldn't go so far as to way it's "wrong", but I don't find it as
conclusive as he does. First, I think it's a category confusion to
say that "Ex(x+1 = 3)" proves that 2 exists. The truth of
mathematical existence statements just implies that the axioms lead
to the proof that a certain predicate can be satisfied. That's not
the same "exist" as "Liz exists". So there is no proof that the UD
exists or even that arbitrarily large numbers exist in the sense
that you exist.
The problem is that (like Winston Smith) I don't know the sense in
which I exist. That's one of my reasons for being on this forum.
Second, he implies that step 8 proves that the physical is
dispensable; but when challenged on the point he grants that is
likely that human-like consciousness can only exist within a
physical environment. So he hasn't proven that the physical is
dispensable. He qualifies this by saying the physical may not be
dispensable, but it isn't "the primitive physical". I think "the
primitive physical" is a strawman. It's ill defined and I don't
know of anyone who asserts it except as a working heuristic. Even
the physicists he accuses of believing in primitive matter, think
that matter may be just mathematical relations (c.f. Max Tegmark,
John Wheeler) and others think it is just a certain way to organize
qualia or knowledge (c.f. Bertrand Russell, Chris Fuchs). Of course
most physicists think the mind/body problem is too ill defined a
problem to tackle right now.
Well, Tegmark and even Wheeler are rather fringey on this one I
believe. Have you read Max's book? He got a lot of flak for
suggesting his MUH. I think Bruno's point is that most physicists
assume the material universe is primitive (irreducible to simpler
things etc). Even you appear to be doing this when you say "That's
not the same "exist" as "Liz exists"."
Good point.
Instead he tries to identify consciousness as just a relation
between operators in modal logic or numbers in arithmetic. The
similarity of relations is suggestive, but I don't see that it
proves anything; or more accurately that it proves too much. It
proves that consciousness is realized by very stupid, even trivial,
programs. Which to me seems like changing the meaning of
"consciousness". But as I say this isn't necessarily wrong - it
might be right is the sense that it can be filled out and made into
a theory with some predictive power and consilience.
Ah, well, that's the point of course. But you may also be chasing a
straw man, or suffering from the category confusion you mention
above when you insist (or appear to insist) that 2 needs to "exist"
for comp to work. Maybe 2 and the UD don't need to exist. Maybe we
have this notion of existence which is abstracted from the
appearance of a physical world, but maybe there is no such thing.
Yes, that's the point indeed.
I must admit I too find it hard to imagine that the totality of my
being is contained in something like "[]p & p" (or whatever it is).
It is not, no more than your being is something like ma. but ma,
actually mg, plays its role, especially when you stand up, likewize
"[]p & p" plays a role, as it makes sense (by incompleteness) and
associate a knower to the machine, a non Lôbian, not quite
computationalist little being, which nitpick on all substitution level.
Arithmetic is full of them, not just the everything list :)
But I also find it hard to imagine that 2 needn't be even, or that
23 could not be prime. Those are also irreducible facts, as far as I
can tell.
I guess I see what you mean. Of course you can derive that 23 is prime
from the definition of prime, in peano arithmetic. The primes already
emerges in some sense, through the existence of arithmetical relations.
Can 2 be even without existing? Maybe it can, but then maybe the
universe can be observable without existing, too.
"This world, like all worlds, is māyā
Quite possible. But with comp, that māyā obeys laws. True or false.
We can explore.
Bruno
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