On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 4:08 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but the >> point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for interaction >> with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction with 'external' >> or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then we must >> contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but simulating some >> of the external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff. >> > > > This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way galaxy. > Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of physics > are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes some > FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess things > up. > > > Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you have to > simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then > all you've shown is that a simulated consciousness can exist in a simulated > world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate. > But if computations are substrate independent in terms of their ability to support consciousness, then the result of the conclusions of the UDA follow. You just need arithmetical realism to get all the computations implementing the evolution of the milky way galaxy. Voila, arithmetic is a candidate theory of all observations (if not everything). Jason > It does not show that a simulated consciousness can exist in THIS world > without being physically instantiated in this world's physics. > What is it your brain is doing but creating its own little world inside the confines of a hollow bone? Is the world your brain creates the same one we live in, or the same one in another creature's head? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
