On 12 August 2014 15:50, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 8/11/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: > > Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum > uncertainty, like all computers, but why do we need to assume QM apply? > > The argument assumes it doesn't apply, so that the computation can be > deterministic. I don't know that it affects the argument, but worries me a > little that we make this unrealistic assumption; especially if we have > include a whole 'world context' for the MG simulation. >
Ah, I see. One of the assumptions of comp is that consciousness is a classical computation. At least I think that's what it means to say that the Church-Turing thesis applies. I suppose a question here is whether QM can introduce some "magic" that allows it to create consciousness from a purely materialistic basis. If so then there's no need for comp because consciousness isn't classically emulable....yes? > This is what I don't see. Why do A's internal processes have meaning, >> while B's don't - given that they're physically identical? >> > B's have meaning too, but it is derivative meaning because the meanings > are copies of A's and A's refer to a world. So it's an unwarranted > conclusion to say, see B is conscious and there's no physics going on. > There's plenty of physics going on in the past that causally connects B to > A's experience. Just because it's not going on at the moment B is supposed > to be experiencing it isn't determinative. Real QM physics can require > counterfactual correctness in the past (e.g. Wheeler's quantum erasure, > Elitzur and Dolev's quantum liar's paradox). > Well, as I've mentioned previously I think time symmetry may sort out those awkward retroactive quantum measurements. But anyway, I guess this is putting the schrodinger's cat before the horse, in that comp only assumes classical computation and attempts to derive a quantum world from it. So I guess we can't necessarily assume real QM physics, or at least not unless we've shown comp to be based on false premises or internally inconsistent, or have a rival theory of consciousness arising naturally from qm and materialism, or some other good reason to do so. I think what I'm trying to say here is that to assume comp must work with real physics is to assume from the start that there is no reversal. > I'm not sure I follow you here. Why does making the simulation bigger > invalidate the argument? Is there a cut-off point? > > I don't know about a cut-off. The argument is a reductio. The conclusion > Bruno makes is that no physical process is necessary to support > consciousness, > OK > consciousness can be instantiated in a Turing machine simulation. > Sorry to split the sentence, but I must admit I thought that latter part was his initial assumption, rather than his conclusion? > But my argument is that the simulation must also simulate a world that the > consciousness interacts with, is conscious *of*, that a physical world is > necessary for consciousness. If it's a simulated consciousness, then it > can be a simulated physics but it has to be some physics. > Right, yes, I see. Or I think I see. That's implying that the comp argument is assuming what it sets out to show, that is, it sets out to show that physics can be derived from consciousness as computation, but if it has to introduce physics to show this, then the argument has become circular. So if interactions with an environment are necessary for consciousness to exist (as part of the definition of consciousness) then the argument is necessarily circular. The question is whether the interaction is necessary, or incidental - "incidental" would mean that consciousness has arisen in a physical world through evolution, and hence is highly specialised as an agent interacting with that world, but it could at least in theory arise some other way (e.g. inside a computer). Although it's hard to imagine how any conscious being could learn anything useful without interacting with some sort of world - it would sure be a blank slate otherwise. So I guess the question boils down to: is a blank slate consciousness - one that isn't aware of anything (except its own existence, I guess) possible? Or to put it yet another way, is Descartes right that "je pense donc je suis" or isn't that enough? Which I have to admit I don't know the answer to. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
