On 8/14/2014 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2014, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/13/2014 7:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Does Bruno actually say what he thinks consciousness is? (This is probably somewhere
beyond the MGA, which is where I tend to get stuck...)
When I've asked directly what it would take to make a robot conscious, he's said
Lobianity. Essentially it's the ability to do proofs by mathematical induction and
prove Godel's theorem. But "ability" seems to be just in the sense of potential, as
a Turing machine has the ability to compute anything computable.
That is what you need for your robot being able to be conscious. OK. But to be
conscious, you need not just the machine/man, but some connection with god/truth.
To put is roughly the believer []p is never conscious, it is the knower []p & p who is
conscious. It is very different: []p can be defined in arithmetic. []p & p cannot be
defined in arithmetic, or in the machine's language.
But that's just an abstract definition. What is the operational meaning of "p".
It is means true in (N, +, *).
That's not operational. The only operational meaning of true derivable in (N, +, *) is
true=provable, but it's essential to your theory that there are true and unprovable
propositions. You can believe there are such propositions and prove that there must be
one, but can you actually produce one? In other words it seems you can get []p, and
[][]p, and [][][]p... but you can't get to p.
This cannot be defined in PA, but you don't need to define it in PA, to get the needed
consequences.
If consciousness depends on knowing and knowing depends of my belief being true, then I
will be unconscious if my belief is mistaken.
Not necessarily, because although your belief is false, you can still have the true
belief that you believe it.
Yes that's [][]p & []p. But people who believe the Earth is flat are not believing that
they believe the Earth is flat. Yet they are conscious. Yet it seems that []p & p, where
p=f implies one is unconscious. I don't think consciousness depends on knowing (as
defined by Thaetateus). Does mere belief, []p, already require consciousness. Or if you
allow unconscious belief what does it add to require that they be true?
[]p can be false, yet [k][]p can be true. That would be the case in a dream, for
example. You believe that you can walk on water (false), but you believe also that you
believe that you can walk and that belief is true, so you are conscious in the dream,
even if the belief that you can walk on water is false.
I recall that [k]x = []x & x.
That makes no sense. Consciousness obviously does not depend on "& p". In my view
consciousnees is creating an internal mode of the world.
That is what []p does. It is related to the 1p consciousness of that belief
through [k][]p
The model includes propositions "p" which are more or less true depending on their
correspondence with the world.
Which world? The arithmetical reality, or a primitive physical world?
The physical world that is necessary for consciousness. Although you said we agreed in
the last post, you revert to assuming that physical=primitive physical and that
arithmetic=reality. I thought what we agreed was that in order for there to be
consciousness there must be some kind or level of physical world that provides a context.
This is what I might refer to as "our reality" allowing that there might be other kinds
(although I doubt it) which is not everything in arithmetic.
Brent
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