On 20 Aug 2014, at 21:39, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2014, at 21:49, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
you wrote Aug.19:
"What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The
brain is not a digital computer running a program, but if it can
be simulated by one, and if the simulation is conscious, and if
the program can be "run" in Platonia rather than on a physical
computer, then every possible brain's consciousness will
necessarily be instantiated. I'm not sure whether self-referential
computations on their own are conscious - that would seem a
further assumption on top of the three mentioned in the previous
sentence - even though it does seem more elegant than simulating
klunky brains.
Let's skip the question of defining Ccness (maybe broader than
BEING ccous) and let me ask HOW do you know that the brain can
generate 'it'? Do you have a brain that never had 'it' and
followed a process BY it(!) generating Ccness?
Those experiments in which computer etc. (NOT some 'brain'-input)
're-started' the process were all carried out on (live?) "brains"
previously capable of doing it (whatever).
I agree that "The brain is not a digital computer running a
program,...".
Are ALL details of the so called "brain"(function?) mapped and
correlated? Are all facets of 'brain' even knowable? we think we
know some. Then newer items are detected (or thought so) and
included smoothly into the previous setup.
IMO we are far from being able to 'simulating' a human brain in
its entirety.
And we will never know if we can do that, but indeed here we can't
know much. yet some people will accept, in the future, such
artificial brains, and the rest is a question of rights. The
question will never be does it work, some people will have the
religion that it works, and that it is handy to explore the Solar
System at the speed of light.
The only real question is "do you accept that your daughter or son
marries a partner who get an artificial kidney, heart and brain".
We cannot know, but we can make bet. Also, we don't know any laws
in nature which is not computable, so your attitude is more a
speculation on some unknown things to prevent testing a possible,
and plausible from the 3p evidences, facts.
We cannot know our level of substitution.
Something like this is possible. The first immortal person, in the
technological relative sense (pursuing the Samsara), will be copied
only at a rough incomplete description of her cortex. Then it will
take her 5224 years to recover some stable sense-full life, recover
smell and genuine vision, and it will take her another millenium to
overcome the amnesia.
We will never know, John.
If true, we can't know it.
But people will bet on level, and that's what we always do. Then we
can make the bet precise and deduce consequences, and ask for
consistency of the set of beliefs.
Plausibly the mobile will get in the ear and in the yes and then in
the peripheral nervous systems, the cerebral stem up to the cortex,
if we made a lapse on the next millennia.
Many humans will refuse, and it is their right, but others will
make the jump. At their risk and peril.
I think long before that people will be "uploaded" to computers
where they will live on (as much as they can afford) in virtual
realities.
OK. One of many more concrete consequence of computationalism. For
economical reason, an ever growing part of the humanity will upload
itself in the 'digital air'.
This will be paid for by their children and relatives who wish to
keep them "alive"
My grand-grand-grand-grand-mother asked me to not forget to visit my
grand-grand-grand-grand-grand-father and mother. Lengthy sundays ...
so they can converse and reminisce with them.
Yeah, smoke some joints or share a little péchet.
I think it could be done now, although crudely.
yes, people upload partially themselves on the net already.
One could assure clients that the well known logician, Bruno
Marchal, has shown that the "uploaded" person is conscious.
I will try to stay calm, Brent. The logician proved the contrary.
Nobody can ever know if the consciousness has been preserved, nor if
the correct level has been chosen. It requires an act of faith. Anyone
who guaranty, or pretend to be able to justify the consciousness
preservation is a con, a charlatan, a liar or a mad.
Above sixteen ? eighteen ? It is your choice, to say yes, or no, to
the shaman. Before, I'm afraid it is your parents, or legal tutor.
This is important, to keep the theology consistent.
No need to mention that by his measure spiders are also conscious. :-)
Jumping spider. And I would say that they are self-conscious, from
looking at many videos.
I love planaria and amoebas, but despite I tend to attribute an
experience (of pleasure when eating, of displeasure with the wrong Ph
around. But I doubt protozoans have the induction abilities of the
jumping spiders.
Jumping spiders and cuttlefishes have big brains.
Greg Egan envisioned such a future in "Permutation City". I once
wrote a one-act play on that theme, which sadly I have not gotten
performed.
So you have the comp fiber. After that it is only a matter of being
very careful in the deduction, because the consequences are counter-
intuitive, doubly so for Aristotelians, who believe that reality =
what we observe. With comp, what we see can only be the result of what
is. Parmenides define real by invariant, and unreal by variant. With
comp, what is can be sum up in the (highly non computable) set of
arithmetical true propositions.
Thanks to G and G*, we can, at the propositional level, sum up many
infinite interviews that we can have with any self-referentially
correct universal machine, and handle with tools the counter-intuitive
parts of self-references, both the 3p, and different 1ps, by the
nuances between []p, []p & p, etc.
To derive physics, we don't need a complex human observer/
introspector, just a machine able to grasp (talk about in a consistent
way) the notion of universal machine/number, so as to be able to
belief p -> []p for all sigma_1 sentence.
We define recursively the beliefs, for a simple (yet non trivial and
sigma_ complete) machine.
The machine can believe in no more than in some identity axioms
(Leibniz) and in
K is a combinator
S is a combinator
if x and y are combinators, then (x y) is a combinator
((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z)).
That's equivalent with RA. To get Löbianity, you need the ability to
make some induction, so the Lôbian machine believes in the infinite
scheme of axioms, like
A(K) & A(S) & (for all x and y (A(x) & A(y) -> A((x y))) ->
for all x A(x)
With a bit of predicate logic to be precise.
That is enough to have the K4 cognitive abilities:
[]p -> [][]p
and
[](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)
Then being a machine makes you NOT immune to diagonalization for any
set of representable beliefs, and that makes you Löbian:
[]([]p -> p) -> []p
Universal computability is "miraculously" immune for diagonalization,
and that is why Church thesis can make sense, and why we have
universal machine.
But there is no such universal provability. For any of them, you can
find richer system. The arithmetical truth eludes all of them. the
löbian being have the cognitive abilities to potentically understand
that, and even to intuit in different ways.
The knower is not Löbian, and even not a machine (in his perspective,
and rightly so).
We might say that it is Grzegorczykian, but I will not insist on that,
for now.
Bruno
Brent
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