On 19 Aug 2014, at 21:49, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis:
you wrote Aug.19:
"What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The
brain is not a digital computer running a program, but if it can be
simulated by one, and if the simulation is conscious, and if the
program can be "run" in Platonia rather than on a physical computer,
then every possible brain's consciousness will necessarily be
instantiated. I'm not sure whether self-referential computations on
their own are conscious - that would seem a further assumption on
top of the three mentioned in the previous sentence - even though it
does seem more elegant than simulating klunky brains.
Let's skip the question of defining Ccness (maybe broader than BEING
ccous) and let me ask HOW do you know that the brain can generate
'it'? Do you have a brain that never had 'it' and followed a process
BY it(!) generating Ccness?
Those experiments in which computer etc. (NOT some 'brain'-input)
're-started' the process were all carried out on (live?) "brains"
previously capable of doing it (whatever).
I agree that "The brain is not a digital computer running a
program,...".
Are ALL details of the so called "brain"(function?) mapped and
correlated? Are all facets of 'brain' even knowable? we think we
know some. Then newer items are detected (or thought so) and
included smoothly into the previous setup.
IMO we are far from being able to 'simulating' a human brain in its
entirety.
And we will never know if we can do that, but indeed here we can't
know much. yet some people will accept, in the future, such artificial
brains, and the rest is a question of rights. The question will never
be does it work, some people will have the religion that it works, and
that it is handy to explore the Solar System at the speed of light.
The only real question is "do you accept that your daughter or son
marries a partner who get an artificial kidney, heart and brain".
We cannot know, but we can make bet. Also, we don't know any laws in
nature which is not computable, so your attitude is more a speculation
on some unknown things to prevent testing a possible, and plausible
from the 3p evidences, facts.
We cannot know our level of substitution.
Something like this is possible. The first immortal person, in the
technological relative sense (pursuing the Samsara), will be copied
only at a rough incomplete description of her cortex. Then it will
take her 5224 years to recover some stable sense-full life, recover
smell and genuine vision, and it will take her another millenium to
overcome the amnesia.
We will never know, John.
If true, we can't know it.
But people will bet on level, and that's what we always do. Then we
can make the bet precise and deduce consequences, and ask for
consistency of the set of beliefs.
Plausibly the mobile will get in the ear and in the yes and then in
the peripheral nervous systems, the cerebral stem up to the cortex, if
we made a lapse on the next millennia.
Many humans will refuse, and it is their right, but others will make
the jump. At their risk and peril.
Bruno
On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 2:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
> wrote:
On Tuesday, August 19, 2014, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>
wrote:
I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.
I've always understood him to be saying, in the first place, that
the dovetailer necessarily generates certain classes of self-
referential computations. Very generally, such computations are then
regarded as emulating self-referred (i.e. first-personal or
indexical) logics that in turn are amenable to treatment as
"beliefs" in realities or appearances. So the idea is that comp
necessarily entails epistemological logics (the "dreams of the
machines") that are *prior* to physics in the sense that only
certain sub-classes will be characterised by the statistical
dominance of physically-lawlike relations over their range of
reference. I've always assumed that it's this logical priority of
"machine psychology" over the subsequent appearance of lawlike
physical relations that constitutes the postulated "reversal".
What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The brain
is not a digital computer running a program, but if it can be
simulated by one, and if the simulation is conscious, and if the
program can be "run" in Platonia rather than on a physical computer,
then every possible brain's consciousness will necessarily be
instantiated. I'm not sure whether self-referential computations on
their own are conscious - that would seem a further assumption on
top of the three mentioned in the previous sentence - even though it
does seem more elegant than simulating klunky brains.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
