2014-09-24 0:36 GMT+02:00 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>: > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 04:57:20PM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > 2014-09-23 16:20 GMT+02:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>: > > > > > > > > And this is a example of why I'm so certain that regardless of what you > > > say "comp" is NOT just a abbreviation for computationalism. > > > Computationalism says that consciousness is what matter does when it is > > > organized in certain ways > > > > > > > No, that's not computationalism... that's functionalism. Computationalism > > involve computations... Consciousness could come from matter organized > in > > certain ways without being the result of a computation. So no, > > computationalism is not "consciousness is what matter does when it is > > organized in certain ways". > > > > Quentin > > > > If I might comment: this is usually called materialism, and it is > basically the idea that consciousness supervenes on matter. >
Yes sure... but it is not computationalism, materialism does not say anything about the mind being a computational object. All I wanted to show is that if this involves anything not computable, then obviously computationalism is false, while materialism could still be true, and the assertion "consciousness is what matter does when it is organized in certain ways" could still be true. Also John Clark as always conflates the notion of matter with primitive matter. And I said it was also functionalism, because it was suggested that copying the arrangement of matter in the same fashion would result in the same consciousness... that could be false even under materialism (because it could be impossible to rearrange matter in the desired way infinitesimally and that no scale was specified at which two arrangement are the same). Quentin > > There is a more extreme version of materialism called physicalism, > which essentially states that consciousness is nothing more than an > epiphenomenon, that physical processes and relationships suffice to > fully and completely explain everything. Physicalism sometimes goes by > the name of eliminative materialism. And IIUC, physicalism is what > Bruno shows is incompatible with COMP, materialism as I use it here is > perfectly compatible. > > Now since John argues that consciousness has real world consequences > in terms of being evolutionary selected, this would make him a > materialist, but not physicalist. > > But as I note in my book, every philosopher of the mind uses these > labels in slightly different, and at times contradictory ways. It is a > woolly mess, to be sure. > > > -- > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret > (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
