2014-09-24 8:58 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: > On 9/23/2014 10:52 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > And I said it was also functionalism, because it was suggested that > copying the arrangement of matter in the same fashion would result in the > same consciousness... that could be false even under materialism (because > it could be impossible to rearrange matter in the desired way > infinitesimally and that no scale was specified at which two arrangement > are the same). > > > QM's no cloning theorem says it would be impossible to make a copy of a > brain, a copy faithful to the quantum state. And I think that making an > imperfect copy, as QM would permit, would very likely make a difference in > the stream of consciousness. In other words the Washington man and the > Moscow man, even assuming they were as perfect copies as QM allows, would > have divergent thoughts even before they opened the door of their > transporter booth. Does this make any difference to the argument - I > don't think so. >
If infinite precision is required, computationalism is obviously false... The level in Bruno's argument can be arbitrary low, it can't be infinitely low... and if it involves duplicating the entire causal universe, it would likely point toward computationalism being false and unhelpful to explain anything. And the only thing I wanted to convey is that I disagree with John Clark assertion about his definition of what is computationalism... his definition about matter arrangement has nothing to do about computationalism. > > I wonder if Bruno's UD model of the world implies the same no-cloning > theorem? > Yes, any piece of matter under Bruno's model is non-cloneable, only because *matter* is an invariant of the infinity of computations supporting your conscious state here and now. Quentin > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
