On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 05:33:00AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 3:39 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> > wrote: > > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 04:56:39PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 10:14 AM, Russell Standish < > > li...@hpcoders.com.au> > > Sufficiency is a loaded term. It is better to stick with supervenience. > > > > > is shown in the MGA reasoning to be useless and can be cut out with > > occam. > > > This sort of usage of language on your part has and is confusing me. > > > > > > > The MGA only works for non-robust universes. As soon as the universe > > is robust, all counterfactuals are in fact physically realised, and > > physical > > supervenience becomes equivalent to computation supervenience, with > > respect to the MGA at least. > > > > > > > > > > ie assuming non-robustness (which IMHO is virtually equivalent to > > > > assuming ultrafinitism - like Norm Wildberger's position). > > > > > > > > > > Please elaborate why non-robustness assumes ultrafinitism. I don't think > > > this holds. > > > > > > > If all the integers (and their arithmetical properties) exist, then we > > have a robust universe. > > > Isn't this a bit quick? > > ISTM a robust physical universe, whatever that may be primitively, is only
You're the one inserting "physical" here, as though it adds anything of interest. An example of a robust universe is the integers. Another is the combinators. > used in UDA to justify initial UD's running. But it's hypothetical > existence finally eliminates, under digital mechanism, the possibility of > utilizing primitively physical universe hypothesis to justify knowledge of > physics, beliefs etc. > > Even if we suppose the real, actual universe to be non-digital in nature, > then this changes nothing within comp, where our virtual reconstitutions > are digital by definition. > > So I don't see: robust universe => all integers exist Nor do I. But then that is the exact inverse of what I stated: the arithmetic reality assumption in COMP entails a robust reality (one in which the UD runs to completion). > > > > The UD exists and "runs to completion". > > > > For this not to be the case, there must be some integers that can > > never be realised. Whilst one can think of bizarre cases such as prime > > numbers stop existing after 10^10^10^10^10^10^10, but all other > > numbers remain existing, the most believable scenario for reality to > > be non-robust is that there is some maximum integer (even if we can > > never know what it is). > > > > That doesn't change what I don't see, but noble try nonetheless. > What is it that you don't see? > > > > It was Bruno who introduced this term, and I believe it was largely in > > response to Peter Jones's criticism, as it doesn't appear in the > > presentation in the Lille thesis. Bruno's position is that the MGA is > > only required for the non-robust case. For many years, I left it at > > that, for being a good little platonist, I could never conceive of > > reality not being robust. > > > But wouldn't this be a bad little platonist? > Aren't they all? :) > > > Plus I could never get the MGA, until I > > realised that it could be made to work, provided you negated the many > > worlds interpretation, and assumed some preferred classical > > reality. That is the core of my paper's critique. I don't know whether > > Bruno ultimately accepted that criticism, but he did manage to > > convince me that the many worlds is already robust, and so does not > > present a problem for his argument. > > > > As for gain - yes we gain something: the understanding of what the MGA > > actually implies. True, it doesn't address the measure issue - that is > > different line of research, to which appendix A is a > > contribution. Whether appendix A belongs in that paper is another > > question, of course, but I guess I was thinking of maybe commenting on > > Jean de la Haye's critique of Bruno's work. > > > > Last I checked I didn't think that it (the "critique"; not your comments on > it, which I haven't read) was worth effort/time. PGC > 3 of his criticisms have been adequately dealt with elsewhere. I'm not convinced by his argument that the measure problem is a problem for the UDA, nor am I convinced that the measure is undefinable (this is what I was getting at in the appendix). Finally, his fifth critique (the ontological problem) is the only one that actually has some legs, IMHO, and it is basically the same critique David Deutsch makes with his Hilbert Hotel example in Beginning of Infinity. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
