On 23 Oct 2014, at 21:36, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,
Yes.
> but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this
I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of
consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask
"what city will you be in?", all that can be said is that the brain
that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow
Excellent, and so he will write in his diary "result of the
experience: Moscow", after having quickly scratch his old prediction
"Washington and Moscow".
Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for
him, now. Nice.
and the brain that receives information about Washington will think
about Washington,
Excellent, and so he will write in his diary "result of the
experience: Washington", after having quickly scratch his old
prediction "Washington and Moscow".
Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for
him, now.
Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4?
and the question "which one is you" can not be answered because in
these circumstances the word "you" has no unique referent .
What? When I go in Washington to interview John-Clark-from-Washington,
I use "you" without no trouble. The same in Moscow. you did survive,
but are duplicated. There is no problem for your first person view.
That view remains all the time unique from that point of view. Yet,
from that first person view, a choice has been made between Washington
and Moscow. As comp predicts, you, each of you, get one bit of
information, despite no external observer got anyone. The randomness
here is guaranty pure private or subjective, or first person.
Likewise, in the iterated self-duplication, it is a simple exercise to
show that the best bet about the possible experience is that you will
live is "white noise". It is equivalent with looking a polarized
photon split beam, you don't expect it to not split!
"In front of arithmetic", it is a far more difficult problem, and comp
confronts us with it, unless (by the Movie Graph Argument UDA step 8)
you give magical special selection power to primary matter (that
nobody has ever detect for obvious reason).
Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem,
if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about
Everett QM, both the frequentist and those like Deutsch using decision
theory.
Bruno
John K Clark
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